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A central concern – some might say obsession – of American administrative law 
scholarship is the appropriate level of judicial deference to agency action.  This issue 
arises in a number of different contexts – from agency interpretations of congressional 
statutes1 or agency regulations,2 to the adequacy of agency decision-making procedures 
and processes,3 to the sufficiency of the evidence on which agencies base their 
adjudicative decisions.4  Much of the academic legal literature considers the internal 
logic, normative justification, or practical effect of the Supreme Court’s deference 
doctrine with respect to these different categories of administrative decision-making.  But 
what, if anything, can explain broader patterns in the Supreme Court’s decisions in cases 
that raise issues of the appropriate level of judicial deference to administrative agencies?  
Do the Supreme Court’s deference decisions – which some scholars have criticized as 
confusing and inconsistent5 – in fact advance systematically a consistent political or 
normative agenda?
The goal of this paper is to examine not the “trees” (the internal logic of particular 
cases or doctrinal tests), but rather the “forest” – the broad patterns of Supreme Court 
deference to administrative agencies, and how the Court adjusts the appropriate level of 
deference over time.  In particular, this paper builds on, and critically re-evaluates, Linda 
Cohen and Matthew Spitzer’s seminal work on the political economy of judicial 
deference.  Cohen and Spitzer advanced the claim that broad patterns in deference 
doctrine are explicable as the Supreme Court’s deliberate transfers of decision-making 
1 See Skidmore et al. v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); United States v. Mead Corp., 530 U.S. 218 (2001).
2 See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926 (1986).
3 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Motor Vehicles Mnfrs. Ass’n v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
4 See Allentown Mack Sales & Service v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 539 (1998); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
340 U.S. 474 (1951).
5 See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447 (1986); Stephen Breyer, 
Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN L. REV. 363 (1986); Sidney A. Shapiro & 
Richard Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 
DUKE L. J. 1051 (1995).
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power back and forth between the executive agencies and the lower federal courts, 
depending on which decision-makers the Supreme Court finds more ideologically 
congenial at a given point in time.  This perspective, Cohen and Spitzer claim, accounts 
for empirically observable shifts in deference doctrine that emerge when the outcomes of 
large numbers of Supreme Court cases are considered together.
Part I of this paper describes the Cohen-Spitzer rational choice theory of Supreme 
Court deference doctrine, lays out that theory’s key assumptions, and summarizes the 
supporting empirical evidence Cohen and Spitzer present.  Part I then explains how this 
paper assesses the empirical support for the theory, both by re-evaluating the time period 
Cohen and Spitzer examine and by assessing whether their theory correctly predicts 
patterns in the Court’s deference doctrine outside their original sample.
Part II describes in detail my methodological approach for re-evaluating and 
extending the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis.  Specifically, Part II describes how I estimate 
the ideological orientation of the Supreme Court, the judges on the circuit courts of 
appeal, and the administrative agencies.  This Part also explains how I selected, coded, 
and weighted the Supreme Court cases included in the study.  Though I attempted to 
follow Cohen and Spitzer’s approach in many respects, there are some important 
differences between this study and theirs with respect to sample selection and 
methodology; these differences are also discussed in Part II.
Part III presents the results of my empirical re-assessment of Cohen and Spitzer’s 
rational choice theory of Supreme Court deference doctrine.  I find surprisingly little 
empirical support for their theory, at least in the strong form in which Cohen and Spitzer 
originally presented it.  On the one hand, my attempts to reproduce Cohen and Spitzer’s 
results for the 1977-1990 period yielded evidence that, though somewhat inconsistent 
with the data Cohen and Spitzer report, is broadly compatible with their theory inasmuch 
as these results indicate an expansion of deference doctrine in the early 1980s.  However, 
in my extension of the empirical analysis to the 1990-2002 period, my results are the 
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exact opposite of what the Cohen-Spitzer theory predicts.  Instead of a contraction of 
deference doctrine in the mid-1990s, the evidence indicates a significant expansion 
during this period, with a contraction only after 2000 – a period when the Cohen-Spitzer 
theory would presumably predict an expansion.
I also find little or no support for the Cohen-Spitzer theory when the sample is 
restricted only to cases involving executive agencies (as opposed to independent 
commissions), or when I compare how the Court treats cases on appeal from liberal and 
conservative circuits.  However, there does appear to be some evidence that, even though 
the decisions of the Court do not seem consistent with the Cohen-Spitzer theory, the 
votes of individual justices on opposite ends of the political spectrum (here, Stevens and 
Rehnquist) do seem consistent with the theory’s general predictions.
Part IV considers the potential explanations for, and implications of, these 
somewhat surprising empirical findings.  In particular, I consider two new tentative 
rational choice explanations for shifting patterns in Supreme Court deference doctrine.  
First, it may be that deference doctrine tends to expand in response to regulatory 
initiatives launched by a new presidential administration that differ substantially from 
those of the preceding administration (the “presidential mandate” hypothesis).  Second, I 
suggest that the Supreme Court may have been ideologically moderate throughout the 
relevant sample period, expanding deference doctrine whenever the circuit courts are too 
liberal or too conservative (the “goldilocks” hypothesis).  Though both these alternative 
hypotheses appear to match the data in my sample somewhat better than the Cohen-
Spitzer hypothesis, they generate divergent predictions for other periods.  Thus, these 
alternatives, and more refined versions of the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis, can and should 
be tested against new data.
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I. The Political Economy of Deference Doctrine: Theory, Evidence, and 
Predictions
A. The Cohen-Sptizer Rational Choice Theory
In two important and influential articles, Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer 
propose a simple, elegant political explanation for the Supreme Court’s shifting patterns 
of decisions regarding the appropriate level of judicial deference to administrative 
agencies.6  Cohen and Spitzer’s theory, which is grounded in the methodology of rational 
choice, makes three key assumptions about judicial behavior.  First, Cohen and Spitzer 
assume that Supreme Court justices and lower court judges have ideological preferences 
that can be characterized as “liberal” or “conservative” in the traditional sense, and that 
these preferences influence judges’ decisions in the cases that come before them.7
Second, Cohen and Spitzer assume that lower court judges are constrained to some 
degree by the decisions of the Supreme Court – perhaps because of some sincere 
commitment to follow the Court’s precedent that may sometimes outweigh ideological 
preferences, or perhaps because lower court judges want to avoid getting reversed on 
6
 The fully-developed version of the theory is presented in Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial 
Deference to Agency Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test 68 SO. CAL. L. REV. 431 
(1996) [hereinafter Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference].  This paper built on previous work in which 
Cohen and Spitzer sought to explain, in rational choice terms, the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, 
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. 
Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (1994) [hereinafter Cohen & Spitzer, 
Puzzle].  
7 See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 441, 444.  This assumption, though fairly 
standard in the political science literature, see, e.g. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002), is still quite controversial among traditional legal 
scholars.  Ronald Dworkin, for example, questions whether the “distinction between conservative and 
liberal justices is a useful distinction at all.” See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 386 (1986).  However, 
the idea that judges are influenced at least to some degree by their political inclinations is at this point well-
established.  See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra.  Though this statement should not be confused with the claim 
that political attitudes are the exclusive or primary determinants of judicial behavior (the assumption is 
often limited to the more modest and defensible claim that political views have some effect), Cohen and 
Spitzer appear to take the stronger position that political/ideological considerations are sufficiently pre-
eminent that their effect can be observed in Supreme Court decisions on deference questions even without 
controlling for other, uncorrelated factors.
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appeal.8  Third, Cohen and Spitzer assume that the Supreme Court is primarily concerned 
with how the deference doctrine it announces will influence the resolution of the vast 
majority of cases that are decided by the lower courts without a hearing in the Supreme 
Court.9  This assumption is critical.  If the Supreme Court could review all cases, 
manipulation of deference doctrine would be irrelevant, as the Court could resolve all 
controversial cases on appeal.  But, in an environment of limited resources, the Court will 
presumably fashion its doctrine so as to influence the resolution of future cases, and this 
consideration – rather than the specific issues raised by any particular case – should be 
the primary determinants of the Court’s doctrinal pronouncements.10
Taken together, these three assumptions imply that the Supreme Court should 
prescribe a higher level of judicial deference to administrative agencies when the 
Supreme Court’s political preferences are more closely aligned with those of the 
administrative agencies than with those of the federal appellate courts.  In contrast, the 
Supreme Court is expected to call for a reduction in the overall level of deference due to 
administrative agencies when the Court believes its preferences are more closely aligned
with those of the lower courts than with those of the agencies.  Thus, a conservative 
Supreme Court facing liberal courts of appeal and a Republican administration should 
favor a relatively high degree of deference, while a conservative Supreme Court with
reliably conservative lower courts but a liberal Democratic administration would prefer a 
8 See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 435-39, 452-55.
9 See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 436-38.
10
 The argument that the Supreme Court’s deference doctrine is shaped by its need to guide the decisions of 
lower courts in the hierarchical federal system has been articulated most forcefully and influentially by 
Peter Strauss.  See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme 
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1003 (1987).  For 
additional empirical evidence supporting this general point about hierarchical control in a different 
doctrinal context see John Gruhl, The Supreme Court’s Impact on the Law of Libel: Compliance by Lower 
Federal Courts, 33 W. POL. Q. 502 (1980).  Similarly, the practice of stare decisis can be interpreted as 
partly reflecting the Supreme Court’s need to influence lower court behavior through roughly consistent 
patterns of decision-making.  See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew C. Stephenson,  Informative 
Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication , 96 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 755 (2002).
Stephenson – Judicial Deference Draft 7/13/2004 7
lower level of judicial deference.  The basic predictions of the Cohen-Spitzer rational 
choice model are shown below in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
B. The Evidence for the Cohen-Spitzer Theory: The 1980s Deference 
Expansion
The Cohen-Spitzer rational choice explanation for the Court’s deference doctrine 
would be a valuable theoretical contribution in its own right.  But Cohen and Spitzer go 
further.  They claim that empirical data on Supreme Court administrative law decisions 
between 1977 and 1990 support the predictions of their hypothesis.  In particular, they 
argue that an examination of case outcomes during this time period shows an increase in 
the level of judicial deference advocated by the Supreme Court in the early to mid-1980s, 
and a gradual tapering off in the later 1980s.11  Cohen and Spitzer interpret this pattern as 
follows.
In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court was relatively moderate, with some staunch 
conservatives (Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist), some passionate liberals 
(Justices Brennan and Marshall), and a core of moderately conservative centrists (e.g., 
Justices Powell and Stewart).  Even though the Supreme Court at this time could not, 
perhaps, be deemed “conservative” in a strong sense, it was nonetheless probably more 
conservative than Carter administration executive agencies.  It was certainly more 
conservative than the federal courts of appeals, which were still filled primarily with 
Democratic appointees, many of whom were unapologetic liberal judicial activists.12
11 See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 464-66.
12
 The most prominent and influential of these liberal judges were probably three D.C. Circuit judges –
David Bazelon, Skelly Wright, and Harold Leventhal – whose opinions were often at odds with the more 
conservative Supreme Court.  See Matthew Warren, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the 
Development of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L. J. 2599 (2002); see also Roy W. 
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This situation corresponds roughly to row 4 in Table 1.  Whether the Court should 
advocate high or low levels of deference in these circumstances depends on whether the 
circuits are more liberal than the agencies (which would imply higher deference) or 
whether they are more conservative (implying lower deference).  In either case, the effect 
on deference doctrine is expected to be muted compared to what happened next.
In the early 1980s, following Ronald Reagan’s election, the executive agencies 
lurched sharply to the right.13  And, the Supreme Court shifted rightwards as well, with 
the relatively conservative Sandra Day O’Connor replacing the more moderate Potter 
Stewart in 1981.14  However, the judges on the federal courts of appeals remained quite 
liberal overall.  Thus, the situation in the early-to-mid 1980s corresponded to row 2 in 
Table 1, implying that the Supreme Court should signal to the lower courts that they 
ought to be more deferential to executive branch agencies.  This, according to Cohen and 
Spitzer, is precisely what one finds in the data.
Cohen and Spitzer further find that pro-deference signals from the Supreme Court 
appeared to decline in the late 1980s.  Here, Cohen and Spitzer rightly point out that the 
absolute deference signal is less important than the trend, i.e. whether the Court is 
signaling to lower courts that they should increase or decrease their deference relative to 
the status quo.  As the circuit courts adjusted to the Supreme Court’s new, more pro-
deference doctrine, the Court had less need to send strong pro-deference signals.15  Thus, 
the lower levels of pro-deference signals in the later years of the Cohen-Spitzer dataset 
McLeese III, Disagreement in D.C.: The Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit 
and its Implications for a National Court of Appeals, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1048 (1984).
13
 This intuitive point has been validated empirically by examinations of changes in agency policy after 
President Reagan’s election.  See, e.g. B. Dan Wood, Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in 
Clean Air Enforcments, 82 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 213 (1988).
14
 In Cohen and Spitzer’s analysis, the Supreme Court’s ideological position did not shift with this or any 
other appointment in the relevant time period, because the median justice under their coding methodology 
was always moderately conservative (appointed by a Republican president and confirmed by a Democratic 
senate).  See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 47.  Alternative coding methodologies 
yields somewhat different results for the Supreme Court’s ideology, see infra TAN 30-37, but the basic 
story is the same in either case.
15 See infra note 75.
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can be interpreted as a return to equilibrium – though a new equilibrium in which the 
circuit courts are more deferential to administrative agency decisions than they had been 
under the old 1970s equilibrium.  Another interpretation, also consistent with the general 
pattern Cohen and Spitzer claim to observe, is that by the late 1980s the courts of appeal 
were considerably more conservative than they had been in the early 1980s, since Reagan 
and Bush appointees had replaced Carter, Johnson, and Kennedy appointees.  Thus, the 
situation by the late 1980s may have corresponded more to the situation described in row 
1 of Table 1, where all three relevant players are conservative, and therefore the 
prediction as to deference doctrine is more ambiguous, but probably lower than what the 
Court would have demanded in the earlier period, where it had a more adversarial 
political relationship with the lower courts.
C. Out-of-Sample Predictions: Extending the Cohen-Spitzer Theory to 
the Clinton Administration and Beyond
The Cohen-Spitzer study is exemplary in part because the theory it develops, 
besides being consistent with the data the authors had available to them at the time, 
generates clear, falsifiable predictions that can be tested against data outside of the 
original sample.  And, as luck would have it, recent political history provides an ideal 
opportunity for testing the robustness of the Cohen-Spitzer rational choice theory against 
new data.  Recall that the theory implies an unambiguous prediction about what ought to 
happen when the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts are conservative, but the 
agencies are liberal.  This situation, which corresponds to row 3 in Table 1, predicts a 
doctrine calling for relatively lower levels of judicial deference to administrative 
agencies.  And, this political alignment – a relatively conservative Supreme Court and 
courts of appeals, but relatively liberal executive agencies – corresponds to the conditions 
that prevailed under the Clinton administration, at least in its early years.  Thus, 
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deference doctrine should have contracted in the mid-1990s.  Cohen and Spitzer make 
such a prediction explicitly, arguing that:
[i]n the Clinton Presidency, one would expect administrative agencies to move 
significantly to the left…  But the majority of Justices and judges on both the 
Supreme Court and courts of appeals will probably remain conservative; it will take a 
while for Clinton’s appointments to move these two institutions.  Assuming that the 
Justices on the Supreme Court are not so enamored of deference that it swamps their 
preferences for conservative policy outcomes, the Supreme Court will most likely 
signal courts of appeals to give less deference to administrative agencies.16
If the Cohen-Spitzer theory is correct, then, we ought to observe a contraction of 
judicial deference doctrine around 1992-1995, and a gradual return to equilibrium 
sometime in the late 1990s – say, around 1997-1999.  In order to test this hypothesis, and 
to explore alternative or complementary explanations for changes in patterns of the 
Supreme Court’s deference doctrine over time, I attempt to reproduce Cohen and 
Spitzer’s empirical assessment of the 1977-1990 period, and I then extend the analysis to 
cover the 1991-2002 period.  Unfortunately, because Cohen and Spitzer’s case coding 
methodology is not clearly explained in their papers, I could not replicate their sample or 
their methods precisely.  I therefore employed what seemed like the most sensible 
method for gathering and coding administrative law cases for their pro- or anti-deference 
content, consistent with the general theory Cohen and Spitzer lay out.  While I attempt to 
replicate Cohen and Spitzer’s method for weighting the cases (by counting reversals of 
lower court decisions as stronger signals than affirmances), I also employ an alternative 
influence-weighting method based on subsequent case citations.  In addition, I follow 
Cohen and Spitzer in examining whether there are systematic differences in deference 
doctrine toward executive agencies as opposed to independent agencies.  I also 
investigate whether there are systematic differences in how conservative and liberal 
justices decide cases raising a deference question – as the Cohen and Spitzer theory 
16
 Cohen & Spitzer, Puzzle, supra note 6 at 108-09.
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presumably would predict – and whether the Court treats liberal and conservative circuits
differently when issuing its rulings.
II. Methodology
In the interests of making my empirical evaluation of the Cohen-Spitzer 
hypothesis as transparent and replicable as possible, this Part discusses methodological 
issues in some detail.  In particular, I first describe my assumptions about the relative 
ideological positions of the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and federal agencies at 
different points in the sample period, and the evidence supporting these assumptions.  I 
then explain how I selected the cases for inclusion in my sample and how I coded these 
cases for their pro- or anti-deference content, and I describe the various weighting 
techniques I employed for aggregating the cases to produce an overall annual deference 
signal for each year in the sample.  Readers who are less interested in these 
methodological details may prefer to skim this Part and focus on the subsequent 
discussion of results and implications in Parts III and IV.
A. Assessing the Players’ Ideology
In order to operationalize the Cohen-Spitzer model for empirical testing, I must 
first characterize the political ideology of the Supreme Court, the circuit courts, and the 
executive agencies.  For the most part, I follow Cohen and Spitzer’s methodology in 
order to maximize comparability between their study and mine.  However, I take a 
different approach in some respects, particularly with regard to assessing the ideology of 
the Supreme Court.  My assumptions about the political preferences of the agencies, the 
circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are discussed in turn.
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1. Agency Ideology
Like Cohen and Spitzer, I assume that the political ideology of administrative 
agencies is determined primarily by the political ideology of the president.  Thus, I 
assume that the agencies were liberal in 1977-1980 and 1993-2000, and conservative in 
1981-1992 and 2001-2002.  This assumption is generally reasonable, given the strong 
evidence of presidential influence over agency policy.17  Inasmuch as operationalizing the 
Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis depends on correctly predicting the changes in agency ideology 
from year to year, therefore, using the president’s party as a proxy ought to be 
sufficient.18
17 See, e.g. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2246 (2001); Terry M. Moe, An 
Assessment of the Positive Theory of “Congressional Dominance, 12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 475 (1987); Thomas 
H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy? Presidential Power, Congressional 
Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-
Making, 12 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 119 (1996); Scott R. Furlong, Political Influence on the Bureaucracy: The 
Bureaucracy Speaks, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 39 (1998).  However, this assumption is subject to 
a few important caveats and qualifications.  First, political actors – for example, the Senate (which must 
confirm many agency leaders) and Congressional subcommittees (with oversight and appropriations power) 
– also influence agency policy, and these other actors may not share the president’s political ideology.  See, 
e.g., Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory 
Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983); J.R. DeShazo & Jody 
Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443 (2003); 
Anne M. Joseph, Called to Testify: Congressional Oversight of Presidential Appointees and the 
Administrative State (Feb. 7, 2003) [unpublished manuscript, on file with author].  Second, agencies have 
their own culture and sense of mission, and even political appointees can sometimes “go native,” seeking to 
advance the agency’s agenda even when it diverges from the president’s priorities. See, e.g., Bruce 
Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 700-01 (2000), HAROLD SEIDMAN & 
ROBERT GILMOUR, POLITICS, POSITION AND POWER (1986).  Third, presidents may sometimes appoint 
agency heads with divergent ideologies in order to improve the credibility of their commitments to certain 
policies.  See Daniel F. Spulber & David Besanko, Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate, 
8 J. L. Econ. & Org. 126, 135-37 (1992).  For these reasons, the difference between the political ideology 
of agencies may vary less with the presidential administration than it might first appear.  Nonetheless, as a 
comparative matter, it still seems fair to say that administrative agencies are much more conservative under 
Republican administrations than under Democratic administrations.
18
 This would not be the case, though, if the ideologies of the agencies and those of the courts were on very 
different scales.  For instance, if for some reason administrative agencies under Republican presidents were 
more liberal than judges appointed by Democratic presidents, then the analysis would be confounded.  A 
shift from a Democratic to a Republican presidential administration in this example would not change the 
fact that a Supreme Court dominated by Republican appointees would prefer low levels of deference.  
However, three is no a priori reason to suppose that this extreme divergence in judicial ideology and 
agency ideology actually obtains.  Moreover, there is some evidence indicating that in fact the ideologies of 
Senators, Presidents, and Supreme Court justices vary within a similar range.  See Michael Bailey, 
“Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices, 1946-2002” (2003) [unpublished draft, on file with author].
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However, though the president has a great deal of authority over executive branch 
agencies, he has less direct control over independent agencies.19  Therefore, following 
Cohen and Spitzer, I test for noticeable differences between cases involving executive 
branch agencies and those involving independent agencies.  If the Cohen-Spitzer theory 
is correct, then shifts in deference doctrine – both expansions and contractions – ought to 
be more pronounced for executive agencies than for independent agencies.
2. Circuit Court Ideology
I next must estimate the average political ideology of the U.S. Circuit Courts of 
Appeal.  Here, I again follow Cohen and Spitzer’s methodology.20  Each judge on the 
federal courts of appeal receives an ideology score of +1 (conservative) if that judge was 
appointed by a Republican president and confirmed by a Republican senate, and gets an 
ideology score of –1 (liberal) if the judge was appointed by a Democratic president with a 
Democratic senate.  Judges appointed by a Republican president with a Democratic 
senate, or appointed by a Democratic president with a Republican senate, are assigned 
ideology scores of +0.7 and –0.7, respectively.  The choice of 0.7 is admittedly arbitrary, 
and is intended to reflect the greater – but not absolute – power that the president has 
over the ideology of the judges he appoints.21  As long as that assumption is reasonable, 
the choice of 0.7 is justifiable.  But, choosing some other number between 0 and 1 would 
not substantially change the qualitative results.22  Again following Cohen and Spitzer, I 
19 See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, surpa note 6, at 447-51.
20 See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 445-47.
21 See William G. Ross, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: A Search for a Synthesis, 57 Alb. L. 
Rev. 993, 1021 (1994); Trece y E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L. J. 1635, 1651 (1998).  See also Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial Model 
of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court 
Nominations, 36 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 96 (1992).
22
 If one believed that the president and the senate had equal influence over the ideology of judicial 
appointees, then all judges whose appointing president and confirming senate are of different parties should 
get an ideology score of 0.  If one believed that the senate actually exerted more influence over the 
ideology of judicial appointees than the president, then the sign would reverse, such that a judge appointed 
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weight active status judges twice as heavily as senior status judges, to reflect the reduced 
caseload, and consequent reduced ideological influence, of the latter set of judges.23
For each year from 1977 to 2002, I take the average ideology score for all the 
judges on the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.24  The average circuit court ideology for 
each year is shown below in Table 2 and depicted graphically in Figure 1.  The circuit 
courts tended, on the whole, to be quite liberal through the mid-1980s.  However, by the 
late 1980s and through the early 1990s, the circuits became progressively more 
conservative, as Presidents Reagan and Bush replaced retiring Democratic judicial 
appointees with more conservative successors.  Under Clinton, the trend reversed, but the 
circuits did not become anywhere near as liberal as they had been under Carter and in the 
early Reagan years.  By the end of the Clinton administration in 2000, the average circuit 
ideology score was about where it was in 1987 – approximately zero.  Using 0.1 and –0.1 
as arbitrary cut-off points, we can say that, of the years considered in the sample, the 
federal circuit courts were liberal from 1977 until about 1985, conservative from 1990 to 
1996, and relatively moderate in the 1986-1989 and the 1997-2002 periods.
[Table 2 about here]
[Figure 1 about here]
by a Republican president with a Democratic senate would be coded as more liberal than a judge appointed 
by a Democratic president with a Republican senate.  However, most observers and scholars have generally 
concluded that the president has greater – though not absolute – control over the ideology of judicial 
appointees.  See supra note 21.  Thus, the Cohen -Spitzer coding rules seem appropriate.
23 See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 445-47.  See also 28 U.S.C. §371 (2000) 
(statutory provisions governing senior status retirement).
24







































where N indicates the number of judges in each category, the superscript on N denotes active status (A) or 
senior status (S), the first subscript denotes the party of the appointing president – Democrat (D) or 
Republican (R) – and the second subscript denotes the party of the confirming Senate.
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The foregoing assessment is subject to two important qualifications.  First, this 
coding methodology assumes that the partisan effects on judicial ideology are constant 
across administrations.  Thus, for example, the analysis assumed that Clinton nominees 
are ideologically similar to Carter or Truman nominees, that Reagan nominees are 
ideologically similar to Eisenhower or Nixon nominees.  This assumption is open to 
question.  Some believe that the appointment process has become more ideological over 
time.25  If this is the case, then more recent appointees should have ideological scores 
with larger absolute values.  Also, party positions may have shifted – many might argue, 
for instance, that Clinton’s judicial nominees were systematically more conservative than 
those of his Democratic predecessors, and that Reagan and Bush’s nominees were also 
more conservative than those of previous Republican administrations.26  If this is true, 
then the quantitative results above understate the conservative shift in the 1980s and early 
1990s, and exaggerate the subsequent liberal reversal.  More refined measurements of 
circuit court ideology are deferred for future research, but the foregoing caveat should be 
kept in mind when interpreting the results.
The second qualification to the results presented in Table 6 and Figure 1 is that 
the average ideology scores of all the circuits taken together obscure important inter-
circuit ideological variation.  For example, the D.C. circuit – by far the most important 
circuit for resolving issues involving the power of administrative agencies – was quite 
liberal up until 1985, and conservative in 1991-1996 and in 2000-2001.  It was moderate 
by my classification standard (i.e., the absolute value of its average ideology score was 
below 0.1) in 1986-1990, 1997-1999, and 2002 (See Figure 2).  In contrast, the Ninth 
25 See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan’s Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 
JUDICATURE 318, 319-20 (1989); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 38-47 (1997). See also 
generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000).
26 See William E. Kovacic, The Reagan Judiciary and Environmental Policy: The Impact of Appointments 
to the Federal Courts of Appeals, 18 B.C. ENVT’L. AFF. L. REV. 669 (1991); Ronald Stidham et al., The 
Voting Behavior of President Clinton’s Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16 (1996); Stephen M. Griffin, 
Legal Liberalism at Yale, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 535, 550 (1997).
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Circuit was liberal in 1978-1986 and in 1999-2002; in all other years it was moderate 
(See Figure 3).  Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit was liberal until 1981, moderate from 
1982 to 1984, and consistently conservative thereafter (See Figure 4).  Thus, 
generalizations about nationwide trends toward “liberal” or “conservative” courts of 
appeal, though meaningful, obscure some important differences between circuits.  I will 
consider below if there are observable variations in the deference doctrine the Supreme 
Court tends to articulate when dealing with an appeal from a more liberal circuit as 
compared to what it does when hearing an appeal from a more conservative circuit.27
[Figure 2 about here]
[Figure 3 about here]
[Figure 4 about here]
3. Supreme Court Ideology
Cohen and Spitzer use the same methodology for determining ideology of 
Supreme Court justices that they use to calculate the ideology of circuit court judges, and 
they presume that the ideology of the Supreme Court can be represented by the ideology 
of the median justice.28  But, there are other methods for estimating the ideological 
preferences of Supreme Court justices, several of which have been employed to generate 
estimated ideal points for all the justices on the Court in the sample period studied here.  I 
consider four possible proxies for Supreme Court justice ideology, and, for each one, I 
consider both the predicted ideology of the median justice and the mean ideology score 
for the whole Court.29
27
 See Part III.B.2, infra.
28 See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 447
29
 The argument for using the median justice to measure the Court’s ideology would be that the swing voter 
(i.e. the median) can always get an outcome at her ideal point in a majority-rule voting system with a one-
dimensional policy space.  However, an exclusive focus on the median justice may be misleading inasmuch 
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The first of the four measures I consider is Cohen and Spitzer’s method, described 
above.  Second, I examine the Segal-Cover scores.30  These scores, which presume a 
unidimensional liberal-conservative measure of judicial ideology,31 are derived from 
newspaper editorials written about the justices between the time that they were nominated 
to the Court and the time that they were confirmed.32  Third, I use estimated judicial ideal 
points from two recent studies, one by Michael Bailey,33 the other by Andrew Martin and 
Kevin Quinn,34 which employ sophisticated multidimensional scaling models to infer 
judicial ideal points from actual votes in decided cases.35  Of these four measures, the 
Bailey and Martin-Quinn calculations appear preferable on methodological grounds, as 
they are derived from more, and more reliable, data about each justice’s revealed 
preferences.  They also appear more consistent with widely held intuitions about the 
ideology of the individual justices, e.g. that Justice Stevens is more liberal than Justice 
O’Connor, and that Justice Brennan was more liberal than Justice White.
The ideology score for each justice, as derived from each of these four measures, 
is shown in Table 3, and the mean and median ideology score for each Court are shown 
in Table 4.  The numerical values in each column are not directly comparable, because 
the measures are scaled differently.  However, the directional movements at each major 
transition point (where one justice departs the Court and is replaced by another) can be 
compared, and the direction of ideological change (if any) according to each possible 
as the actual process of forming a majority coalition and drafting the language of the opinion involves a 
more complicated bargaining process.  Using the mean ideology score better reflects the influence that 
more ideologically extreme justices may have on final outcomes.
30 See Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, 83 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995).
31 See Segal & Cover, supra note 30, at 559.
32 See Segal & Cover, supra note 30, at 559-60.
33
 Michael Bailey, “Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices, 1946-2002” (Sept. 2002) [Unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author].
34
 Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, “Bayesian Learning about Ideal Points of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, 1953-1999” (July 9, 2001) [Unpublished manuscript, on file with author].
35
 These models generate more complex output than the simple Segal-Cover scores.  I rely on the “posterior 
mean” ideal point calculated by Martin & Quinn, see supra note 34 at 33, and the “Theta” score for each 
justice calculated by Bailey, see supra note 33 at 23.
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measure of Court ideology is shown below in Table 5.  I also re-scale seven of the eight 
measures36 on a unit interval, where the “0” value is assigned to the period where, 
according to that measure, the Court was most liberal, and the “1” is assigned to the 
period where the Court was most conservative.  These values, depicted in Figure 5 and 
Figure 6, are still not directly comparable, but they are useful in showing which transition 
points represented the most significant ideological shifts, according to each measure.
[Table 3 about here]
[Table 4 about here]
[Figure 5 about here]
[Figure 6 about here]
The results for mean Supreme Court ideology (Figure 5) are broadly consistent 
across all four measures.  The 1977-1981 period was the most liberal Court in the sample, 
the Court became somewhat more conservative in the 1982-1990 period, and it became 
sharply more conservative from 1991 to 1993 (the most conservative Court in the 
sample).  The Court became somewhat more liberal in the 1994-2002 period, but was not 
as liberal as it had been in 1991 or before.
The results for the ideology of the median justice (Figure 6) are less consistent 
across indicators, and generally more difficult to interpret.  First, the ideology of the 
median justice according to the Cohen-Spitzer party-based technique is 0.7 – the score 
associated with a Justice appointed by a Republican president and confirmed by a 
Democratic Senate – in every year in the sample.  Second, the Segal-Cover median scores 
indicate that the Court shifted to the left in 1988-1991 (with Kennedy replacing Powell 
and Souter replacing Brennan), which seems intuitively wrong based on what we know 
36
 I do not rescale the median justice’s ideology score as measured by the Cohen-Spitzer method, because 
this measure does not vary throughout the sample period.
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about the political ideologies of these justices.  Restricting the focus to the Bailey and 
Martin-Quinn measures reveals a more sensible pattern, and one broadly consistent with 
the pattern observed for mean ideology scores: the Court became somewhat more 
conservative in the early 1980s (when O’Conner replaced Stewart), and sharply more 
conservative in the early 1990s (when Thomas replaced Marshall).37
For purposes of the subsequent discussion and analysis, I will concentrate on what 
I conclude, from the foregoing data, are the two most important and relevant shifts in 
Supreme Court ideology in the sample period: a first rightward shift in 1981-82, and a 
second, somewhat more pronounced rightward shift in 1991-92.
B. Sample Selection
In order to test whether the ideological shifts discussed above had the predicted 
effect on Supreme Court deference decisions, I must identify the relevant cases in the 
sample period and code them for the strength and direction of the deference signal they 
send.  Ideally, this research would replicate the Cohen-Spitzer project by employing, at 
least initially, identical cases selection and coding techniques.  However, Cohen and 
Spitzer’s dataset is not publicly available, and their paper does not provide a description 
of their techniques that is detailed enough to generate identical data.38  I therefore employ 
my own method, making use of the search tools available through a number of existing 
on-line databases to compile the set of Supreme Court cases, decided between 1977 and 
37
 Even here there are some important inconsistencies.  First, while both Martin-Quinn and Bailey’s 
estimates show the Court becoming more conservative in 1981-82, Bailey estimates that this was a 
relatively large change (about as large as the in 1991 shift), but Martin and Quinn estimate that it was an 
extraordinarily small change – almost imperceptible when compared to the 1991 change.  Second, 
considering only the median, rather than the mean, indicates no significant change in Supreme Court 
ideology from 1992 to 2002, whereas the mean ideology shifted to the left in this period.
38
 I contacted Professors Cohen and Spitzer requesting either their original data or a detailed description of 
their coding methodology, but unfortunately they were unable to provide this information.
Stephenson – Judicial Deference Draft 7/13/2004 20
2002, in which a significant portion of the opinion dealt with the issue of how much 
deference reviewing courts ought to accord to agency decisions.  
I searched three on-line databases of Supreme Court opinions: Westlaw, Lexis, 
and USSCPlus,39 using search assistant tools provided by each of these sources.40  I also 
performed a supplemental Lexis keyword search,41 and used Westlaw’s KeyCite subject 
headings to check for additional cases on the same legal topics that did not come up in 
the other searches.42  I eliminated from the data set all those cases that did not involve 
some issue relating to the amount of deference that the judiciary ought to accord to an 
administrative agency’s decision.  My case selection procedure yielded 221 relevant 
cases in the 1977-2002 period, or an average of 8.5 cases per year.43  A complete list of 
the 221 cases included in the analysis is provided in Appendix A.
There are three potentially important distinctions between my approach to sample 
selection and Cohen and Spitzer’s approach.  First, Cohen and Spitzer – at least in their 
first paper – claim to restrict their attention to statutory interpretation cases.44  However, 
39
 All the searches were conducted December 23-25, 2002.
40
 On Westlaw, I examined all cases listed in Westlaw’s KeySearch service under the headings 
“Administrative Law – Judicial Review – Scope of Review” and “Administrative Law – Statutory 
Construction.”  On Lexis, I examined all cases listed in Lexis’s Search Advisor under the heading 
“Administrative Law – Judicial Review – Standards of Review – Standards Generally.”  On USSCPlus, I 
examined all cases under the heading “Administrative Law.”  The use of these on-line search assistants 
may be justified not only because they are convenient for the researcher, but also because inclusion of a 
case in such a directory is likely to correlate strongly with whether that case would be viewed by lower 
courts as an important signal of the Supreme Court’s views.
41
 I searched for any variant on the words “agency” or “commission” within five words of the word 
“interpretation.”
42 I did this by checking the Westlaw KeyCite headnotes for each case found through the initial searches, 
identifying those headnotes that were most relevant to the issue of judicial deference to agency decisions, 
and using Westlaw’s “Most Cited Cases” function to identify all other Supreme Court cases that raised the 
same legal issue.  If any of these cases raised an issue of judicial deference to an agency decision, I added 
the case to the dataset.  .  This procedure identified an additional 33 cases for inclusion in the dataset.
43
 It is worth noting the relatively high degree of variance in the number of cases decided in different years.  
The year in the dataset with the most cases is 1981 – sixteen decisions that year involved some issue of the 
appropriate level of judicial deference to agency decisions.  In contrast, 1993 saw only three such cases –
the lowest number for any year in the sample.  The variance of number of cases decided per year is 12.1, 
and the standard deviation is 3.48.
44 See Cohen & Spitzer, Puzzle, supra note 6 at 103 (stating that their dataset contains “administrative 
appeals that required a decision on statutory interpretation”).  The later paper also appears at the outset to 
focus exclusively on deference to agency statutory interpretations.  See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial 
Deference, supra note 6 at 433 (“We consider specifically the doctrine of judicial deference, elucidated in 
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my dataset includes cases where some issue regarding the degree of judicial control over 
agency decision-making came up; the cases are not limited to statutory interpretation (i.e. 
Chevron) cases, nor are the cases distinguished according to the doctrinal categories into 
which lawyers and legal scholars would normally sort them.  I took this approach for two 
reasons.  The first and more substantive reason is that the hypothesis under consideration 
– that the Supreme Court shifts power to its ideological allies – does not differentiate, as 
lawyers arguing a case might, between different types of agency action and the different 
tests or verbal formulations that courts employ.  One might press this point further by 
suggesting that the ordinary doctrinal classifications may obscure the degree to which the 
Supreme Court shifts power between agencies and reviewing courts, but that these 
patterns become clearer when evaluating all such cases together.  The second reason for 
considering doctrinally distinct cases in one dataset is that, given the relatively small 
number of cases – only 221 total – subdividing the data set by doctrinal category is likely 
to make it too difficult to discern general patterns.45
The second difference is that Cohen and Spitzer (at least in their latter paper) 
appear to consider all cases in which the Supreme Court heard an appeal from a case 
involving an administrative agency, looking at whether the government won or lost at the 
circuit court level and the Supreme Court level, without filtering out those cases that 
raised no real issue of deference to an agency decision.  Because I did not have access to 
Cohen and Spitzer’s dataset, I cannot verify that this is the case, but it seems likely given 
Chevron … wherein the Supreme Court instructed appellate courts to defer to any ‘reasonable’ statutory 
interpretation offered by administrative agencies.”)  However, the numbers of Supreme Court cases per 
year reported in the second paper are considerably higher than the number reported in the first paper,
suggesting that the dataset used for the later work included additional cases.  Compare Cohen & Spitzer, 
Puzzle, supra note 6 at 103 Tab.7 with Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6 at 459 Tab.3.
45
 On this point, the numbers of statutory interpretation cases that Cohen and Spitzer report seem too large.  
For example, they claim that in 1989, 13 Supreme Court cases dealt with an issue of deference to an agency 
statutory interpretation.  See Cohen & Spitzer, Puzzle, supra note 6 at 103 Tab. 7.  However, a Westlaw 
search revealed only three cases that year that even cited Chevron.  Again, because Cohen and Spitzer’s 
case selection method is not explicit, I cannot be sure how they arrived at 13 statutory interpretation cases, 
but it seems highly implausible that ten cases raising a Chevron issue would not cite Chevron.
Stephenson – Judicial Deference Draft 7/13/2004 22
their description of their methodology46 and the puzzlingly high number of cases in their 
dataset relative to my attempt at replication.47  But, not all lawsuits between an agency 
and a private party – not even in cases that involve some statutory interpretation issue –
involve the issues of judicial deference to agency action with which the Cohen-Spitzer 
hypothesis is concerned.  Some such cases, for instance, only raise questions of civil 
procedure in federal court,48 attorneys’ fee awards,49 or other issues peripheral to the 
question of the validity of agency decisions.  I screened out such cases, which may 
explain why my case count is considerably lower than Cohen and Spitzer’s for the years 
where our samples overlap.
Third, unlike Cohen and Spitzer, in this research project I do not examine denials 
of certiorari, nor do I examine patterns of deference at the lower court level in cases 
where the Supreme Court did not grant review.50  Therefore, this study does not attempt 
to replicate all aspects of Cohen and Spitzer’s original empirical work, but only on those 
elements of their analysis that focused on the cases actually decided by the Supreme 
Court.  I believe that this focus on actually decided cases is substantively justified given 
the nature of the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis, which emphasizes the signals that the 
Supreme Court sends to lower courts.   It seems more plausible that the Supreme Court 
would influence lower court decision-making through its express holdings rather than 
through patterns of cert grants and cert denials; the former are easily observable by the 
lower courts, whereas the latter are not.  Therefore, while analysis of lower court 
46 See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 456-57.
47 See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 459 Tab. 3.
48 See, e.g. Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617 (1990) (reviewing whether a district court’s order to the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services was a “final order” sufficient to confer 
appellate jurisdiction on the court of appeals, but not reaching the substantive question whether the 
Secretary’s determination was legally valid).
49 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989) (holding that the Equal Access to Justice Act allows 
courts to award attorneys’ fees to a Social Security claimant for representation before an administrative 
proceeding following a judicial remand to the Secretary of Health and Human Services).
50
 In this sense, my approach in this paper differs from several elements of the Cohen-Spitzer study.  See 
Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 462-65.  Though this difference might explain the 
difference in our results, that would be the case only if cert denials sent a stronger signal to lower courts 
than would seem plausible.
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decision-making patterns and Supreme Court cert decisions would enrich the analysis, the 
main hypothesis under investigation can be assessed – at least as a preliminary matter –
by focusing on whether and how the Supreme Court shapes deference doctrine through 
the Court’s written opinions. 
C. Generating an Annual Deference Signal: Coding and Weighting
1. Coding: Pro-Deference or Anti-Deference?
After identifying the set of cases in which the Supreme Court arguably sent a 
message to the lower courts regarding the appropriate level of deference to administrative 
agency decisions, the next issue involves how to evaluate and weight the relative strength 
of those messages.  As a first step, I attempted to classify all cases as pro-deference or 
anti-deference.  Even this simple approach involves some problematic coding issues, 
however.
First, some cases have mixed holdings – that is, the Supreme Court called for 
deference to the agency as to one portion of its decision, but refused deference on some 
other element of the case.  For example, in American Textiles Manufacturing Institute v. 
Donovan,51 the Court upheld the Secretary of Labor’s decision not to use cost-benefit 
analysis when setting cotton dust standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA), but invalidated another OSHA regulation related to wage guarantees for 
transferred employees as not supported by a sufficient statement of reasons that this rule 
was related to the Act’s health and safety goals.  Similarly, the Court in NLRB v. Baptist 
Hospital52 upheld one of the challenged National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rules 
51
 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
52
 442 U.S. 773 (1979).
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relating to union solicitation in hospitals as supported by substantial evidence, but 
invalidated a related rule as too sweeping.
Second, the message sent by some cases is ambiguous because, while the Court 
upholds the agency action, it does so using language – often cited in future cases – that 
seems to stand for the proposition that courts should scrutinize certain types of agency 
action quite carefully.  For instance, Lyng v. Payne53 upheld a decision by the Farmer’s 
Home Association (FmHA) as consistent with the agency’s regulatory requirements, but 
noted that an agency’s authority is no greater than that conferred by Congress – a 
proposition, cited in a few subsequent cases, that suggests limits on agency discretion.  
The opposite can occur as well, and in fact may happen more frequently.  For instance, in 
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,54 the Court invalidated an NLRB decision as inconsistent with 
established precedent, and held further that the stare decisis principle trumped the normal 
deference that would be accorded that sort of agency decision.  But, though the outcome 
of the Lechmere case is anti-deference, the opinion’s language regarding the judicial 
deference that NLRB opinions are ordinarily due was cited in several subsequent cases to 
support pro-deference outcomes.  Relatedly, the Court sometimes upholds an agency 
action, and recites standard pro-deference language, yet reaches its conclusion without 
according special deference to the agency’s determination.  This appears to what 
happened in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,55 where the Court upheld anti-
discrimination regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW), and noted that agency interpretations are normally entitled to great 
deference, but asserted that the ordinary level of deference was not appropriate in that 
particular case.56
53
 476 U.S. 926 (1986).
54
 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
55
 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
56 Bell, 456 U.S. at 522 n.12.
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These potential problems turn out not to be as severe as one might expect, 
however.  For the overwhelming number of cases in the dataset, the outcome of the 
particular case and the most-cited legal propositions articulated in that case point in the 
same pro-deference or anti-deference direction.  When coding the ambiguous cases, I 
adhered to the following principles.  First, where one aspect of the holding appeared 
considerably more important than the others, I used the deference signal sent on the more 
important element of the case.  Second, where there were multiple aspects of the Court’s 
holding that seemed equally important, but one was cited significantly more often than 
the others in subsequent cases, I generally presumed that the more-cited provision was 
the more relevant aspect of the Court’s holding.  Third, because anti-deference signals are 
so much rarer in the data, in close cases I erred on the side of coding mixed or ambiguous 
cases as anti-deference if the anti-deference portion of the holding appeared significant.  
For a few cases, it was sufficiently difficult to classify the holding as pro- or anti-
deference (i.e., cases where separate portions of the holding that pointed in different 
directions, or where the general legal principle that the Court stressed appeared at odds 
with the outcome in the particular case) that I could not confidently categorize them; 
these cases (only four out of the 221 in the dataset) were assigned a deference score of 0.  
My coding decisions obviously involve debatable judgment calls.  For that reason, and in 
the general interests of transparency, I have listed what I considered to be ambiguous 
cases, and my coding decisions, in Appendix B.
Another potentially problematic issue is whether to include those cases that 
involve Supreme Court review of state supreme court decisions, direct review of federal 
district court decisions, or exercises of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.  Since 
the main question at issue is the degree to which the Supreme Court influences the 
behavior of federal appellate courts, one might reasonably question whether decisions not 
involving review of federal appellate court decisions are relevant to the analysis.  I 
believe that they are.  The Supreme Court can communicate its deference doctrine 
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through its holdings regardless of which lower court’s decision it is reviewing.  Indeed, 
fundamental to the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis is the premise that Supreme Court decisions 
matter not only to the particular court whose decision is appealed, but more broadly as a 
signal of the Court’s preferences to all lower courts.  Again, this potential problem turns 
out to be marginal in practice, as only fourteen cases in the data set do not involve review 
of a federal circuit court decision.  These cases are listed in Appendix C, and their 
exclusion does not fundamentally affect the results.
There is another difficulty, more significant and more conceptual, with assessing 
the overall deference signal that the Supreme Court sends to lower federal courts in any 
given year.  This is the question of whether the relevant variable is the annual aggregate
deference signal – that is, the total number of pro-deference cases decided in a given year 
net the number of anti-deference cases decided in the same year – or the annual average
deference signal – that is, each year’s aggregate deference signal divided by the number 
of cases decided that year.
On the one hand, one might suppose that the total number of cases that the Court 
chooses to hear is itself an important aspect of the message that it sends to the lower 
courts.  Thus, a year in which the Court issued nine pro-deference cases and no anti-
deference cases ought to be considered as a year when the Court sent a stronger pro-
deference signal than the signal the Court sent in a year with three pro-deference cases 
and no anti-deference cases.  Or, to take a starker example, what if the Court in Year X 
decides nine pro-deference cases and one anti-deference case, and in Year Y decides only 
one case, but issues a pro-deference holding in that case?  Taking the average signal 
would suggest a stronger pro-deference signal in Year Y than in Year X (1.0 vs. 0.9), but 
that conclusion might seem suspect.
On the other hand, the number of cases per year is small, and a number of other 
factors may influence the number of cases on the Court’s docket that happen to raise a 
deference issue.  Assigning too much weight to the aggregate deference signal may 
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obscure the Court’s actual attitude toward the appropriate level of judicial deference to 
agency decisions.  For instance, suppose in Year X the Court issues two pro-deference 
holdings and one anti-deference holding, and in Year Y the Court issues ten pro-
deference holdings and five anti- deference holdings.  Here, the proportion is constant, but 
looking at the aggregate signal would suggest that the pro-deference signal in Year Y is 
much stronger than in Year X.  But if there is enough random fluctuation in the number 
of cases, that conclusion might be seriously misleading.  Turning from the hypothetical to 
the real, the actual number of Supreme Court cases decide per year declined substantially 
between 1977 and 2002.57  The aggregate signal is therefore likely to exaggerate the 
signal sent in the earlier years of the sample relative to the later years.  
The theory of Supreme Court signaling to lower courts is too underdeveloped to 
decide conclusively between these alternatives.  Cohen and Spitzer approach the problem 
by estimating, based on the average number of decided cases, the rate at which the 
Supreme Court denied cert in deference cases, and “deflating” the average deference 
signal accordingly.58  I take a different approach, reporting both the aggregate deference 
signal and the average deference signal.
2. Case Weighting – Three Approaches
a. Equal Weighting
The simplest way to generate an annual deference signal is to add up or average 
the pro- and anti-deference cases in each year, and that is the first approach I employ.  I 
assign a score of +1 to every case where the Supreme Court indicated that deference to 
57 See infra Table 6 and Figure 14.
58 See infra note 76.
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administrative agencies was appropriate, and a score of –1 to every case where the 
Supreme Court endorsed more aggressive judicial scrutiny of agency decisions.
However, the simple case-counting approach implies a strong and implausible 
assumption: that every case that the Supreme Court decides sends just as strong a signal 
to the lower courts as every other case.  This leads to some bizarre coding results.  
According to the simple case-counting approach, Chevron v. NRDC59 and Community 
Television of Southern California v. Gottfried60 both get a “+1” pro-deference score, even 
though the former is perhaps the most significant and widely-cited administrative law 
decision of the last century, while the latter stands only for a relatively obscure 
proposition about Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licensing authority.  This 
problem raises serious questions about the validity of any results derived using an equal-
weighting method.  Unfortunately, there is no easy, objective way to validly and reliably 
weight Supreme Court cases by their importance, i.e. their subsequent influence on the 
decisions of lower courts.  But, measures more refined than the simple case-counting 
method are possible.  I therefore employ, in addition to the equal-weighting approach, 
two alternative weighting methods.  First, I follow Cohen and Spitzer’s method of 
weighting Supreme Court reversals more heavily than affirmances.  Second, I develop an 
alternative, and I believe superior, method of weighting cases by their influence, 
measured as a function of citations per month.
b. The Cohen-Spitzer Method: Double-Weighting 
Reversals
Cohen and Spitzer weight those cases where the Supreme Court reverses a lower 
court decision twice as heavily as cases where the Supreme Court affirms the lower court.  
59
 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
60
 459 U.S. 498 (1983).
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Thus, if the lower court did not defer to the agency but the Supreme Court reversed, the 
case is coded as a “+2”, but if the lower court deferred and the Supreme Court affirms, 
the case is coded as a “+1”.61  The rationale is that lower court judges don’t like getting 
reversed, and so they treat reversals as more salient signals.62
The evidence that lower court judges don’t like to be reversed notwithstanding, 
the assumption that reversals send a signal twice as strong as affirmances is problematic.  
The key dynamic involved in the theoretical framework Cohen and Spitzer elaborate is 
the signal that a Supreme Court decision sends to all lower courts.  Even if judges are 
particularly averse to having their own decisions overturned, it’s not clear why the signal 
sent by the Supreme Court in a given case to other lower courts depends on whether the 
lower court in that case got reversed.  In fact, there is at least a plausible argument that, 
because most of the cases that the Supreme Court takes are cases it wants to reverse,63
affirmances may send an especially strong signal.  After all, why would the Supreme 
Court grant cert to a case that it views as correctly decided, if not to signal to other courts 
the proper resolution of a particular legal issue?
Even if one thinks that reversals are, on average, stronger signals than 
affirmances, the Cohen-Spitzer weighting system is still not entirely satisfactory.  First, 
the choice of a 2:1 ratio of signal strength is an arbitrary but potentially potent 
assumption.  Why not 3:1?  Or 1.5:1?  Because the methodology involves counting cases, 
these numbers have cardinal as opposed to purely ordinal meaning, and the results are not 
likely to be robust to alternative weightings.  Also, this weighting system still doesn’t 
61 See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 464.
62 See Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making, J. ECON. BEHAV. 
& ORG. 23 (1994); Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107, 
128-32 (1983).  But see Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 129 
(1980).
63 See John F. Krol & Saul Brenner, Strategies in Certioriari Voting on the United States Supreme Court: A 
Reevaluation, 43 W. POL. Q. 335 (1990).  Reversals were indeed more common than affirmances in my 
sample of 221 cases, though not by as much as one might expect.  Of the 221 cases, 132 (59.7%) were 
coded as reversals, 87 (39.4%) were affirmances, and two (0.9%) involved a sufficiently divided holding 
that they could not be satisfactorily classified as either, and so were given a score of 0 under this weighting 
methodology.
Stephenson – Judicial Deference Draft 7/13/2004 30
address the problem illustrated by the Chevron/Gottfried comparison noted above.64
Nonetheless, while I am skeptical of the Cohen-Spitzer emphasis on whether the 
Supreme Court decision was a reversal or an affirmance, in the interests of comparability 
I code all the cases in the sample using this methodology.  For some cases, the Supreme 
Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, and both parts of the decision were either pro-
or anti-deference.  Cohen and Spitzer’s discussion of their methodology does not explain 
how they coded such cases.  Because of the emphasis on the scariness to lower courts of 
any reversal implied by the weighting theory, I coded these cases as reversals.
c. Citation-Weighted Influence Scores
An alternative approach to weighting the cases in the sample is to use citation 
counts as a proxy for influence.  Such an approach is obviously imperfect, especially 
since simple citation counts don’t reveal whether a given citing case relies on the cited 
case for the outcome-determinative legal test, or whether the cited case is merely listed in 
a string cite buried in a footnote.65  Nonetheless, citation counts are a reasonable proxy 
for case influence and importance.
I weight each case in the sample by multiplying its raw deference score (+1 or –1) 
by an “influence factor.”  I calculate the influence factor by, first, finding the Westlaw 
KeyCite headnote for each case that most closely corresponds to the deference signal.  If 
multiple headnotes appeared relevant, I chose the one for which the case was more often 
cited.  I then used Westlaw’s “Most Cited Cases” function to count the number of times 
the case had been cited for the relevant proposition by federal courts of appeal as of 
December 26, 2002.  The “influence function” for each case is a function of the number 
64 See supra TAN 59-60.
65
 It would be theoretically possible, but far too time consuming, to check the context of each case citation.
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of citations and the number of months since the case was decided.66  The 221 cases in the 
sample ranged from a maximum influence factor of 4.85 (Chevron), to a minimum of 
0.14 (Mohasco Corp. v. Silver67), with a mean value of 1.94 and a median of 1.88.
A cursory scan of the cases ranked by their influence factor (provided in 
Appendix D) suggests that this measure is generally consistent with legal scholars’ 
intuitions about which of the Supreme Court’s administrative law decisions have been 
most important.  According to this weighting technique, the top five most influential 
cases out of the 221 in the sample are, in descending order of influence, Chevron, Motor 
Vehicles Manufacturer’s Association v. State Farm,68 Heckler v. Campbell,69 Bowen v. 
Georgetown University Hospital,70 and INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.71  The weighting 
system also seems to do a reasonably good job in assigning high scores both to influential 
recent cases – Christensen v. Harris County72 and U.S. v. Mead73 rank 21st and 35th with 
respective influence factors of 3.48 and 2.94 – and to influential older cases – Vermont 
Yankee v. NRDC,74 for instance, comes in 32nd on the list with a score of 3.02.
The influence-weighted scores, for all their imperfections, thus seem to offer 
distinct advantages over weighting cases by whether they were affirmances or reversals, 
or counting all cases equally.  Nonetheless, I consider all six measures of deference signal 
66
 The precise influence function calculation is ( ))ln(1 11ln),( mcmcf +++= , where c is the total number of 
citations and m is the total number of months.  I add one to the citation count in the numerator because 
otherwise recent cases with no citations would be counted as having zero influence.  I use a natural log 
function of months in the denominator of the fraction inside the parentheses because of the assumption that 
cases are cited frequently in the few years after they are first decided, but (with a few exceptions) less 
frequently in the more distant future.  A straight division would therefore underweight the influence that 
older cases had in their immediate aftermath.  I take the natural log of the whole function inside the 
parentheses because I assume a decreasing marginal significance of additional case citations.
67
 447 U.S. 807) (1980).
68
 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
69
 461 U.S. 458 (1983).
70
 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
71
 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
72
 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
73
 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
74
 435 U.S. 519 (1979).
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strength (aggregate and average yearly scores for each of the three weighting methods) in 
the subsequent analysis.
III. Results
Following the various coding and weighting methodologies described above, I 
assess the trends in judicial deference doctrine for the 1977-2002 period.  This simple 
empirical analysis, like the original Cohen and Spitzer papers, does not attempt to control 
for other factors.  This is not only because such an analysis would be methodologically 
difficult given the nature of the problem and the small number of cases, but also because 
the Cohen-Spitzer result under investigation is not merely a marginal comparative statics 
hypothesis, but rather a strong claim that observable trends in deference doctrine can be 
predicted solely from relative political alignments of courts and agencies.
The results are somewhat surprising.  First, the patterns of deference doctrine in 
the Supreme Court’s decisions do not seem to match what Cohen and Spitzer’s rational 
choice theory predicts.  Although the patterns in the 1977-1990 period are roughly 
consistent with the theory, even here there are some significant differences between the 
data Cohen and Spitzer report and what I find.  In particular, in terms of aggregate 
deference signal, I find high degrees of deference demanded in the late 1970s under 
Carter, whereas Cohen and Spitzer found relatively low levels.
Much more importantly, I find no evidence that the Supreme Court signaled a 
contraction of deference doctrine in the early to mid-1990s, as the Cohen-Spitzer theory 
would predict.  Quite the opposite.  Though the trend is not completely clear – and shows 
a worrying lack of robustness to different specifications – most versions of the data seem 
to indicate a significant spike in the average level of judicial deference called for by the 
Supreme Court from about 1993-94 to about 1996-97, and then a relatively steady decline 
until 2000.  These results are hard to square with the Cohen-Spitzer theory, since the 
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conservative Supreme Court appears to be shifting power from relatively conservative 
appellate judges to Clinton’s more liberal executive agencies.
Also contrary to Cohen and Spitzer’s results, I find do not find the predicted 
difference between the Supreme Court’s treatment of executive and independent 
agencies.  Though the independent agencies tended to receive less deference throughout 
the sample period, this was the case not only under Reagan (where the Cohen-Spitzer 
theory would predict such a difference) but also under Clinton (where the Cohen-Spitzer 
theory would predict the opposite).  Nor did investigation of whether the Court treated 
appeals from liberal circuits differently than appeals from conservative circuits yield any 
discernable distinctions.  In those years when the mix of cases was sufficient to allow a 
comparison, the Court appeared to send a very similar deference signal in cases from 
both liberal and conservative circuits.  This additional evidence casts further doubt on 
Cohen and Spitzer’s political explanation for changing patterns of deference doctrine.
However, consistent with the Cohen-Spitzer theory, I do find noticeable 
differences, of the sort the theory would predict, in the voting patterns of the conservative 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the liberal Justice Stevens, both of whom were on the Court 
throughout the entire sample period.  Rehnquist was more prone than Stevens to take a 
pro-deference line when Reagan was in office, but during the Clinton years Rehnquist 
was considerably less likely to defer to agencies than Stevens.  However, though these 
results suggest that something like the Cohen-Spitzer theory may have some influence on 
justices’ voting behavior, that influence appears more marginal than Cohen and Spitzer’s 
earlier results implied.  Stevens and Rehnquist diverged in the predicted manner, but this 
divergence occurred in barely more than a third of the cases in the sample; Cohen and 
Spitzer’s predicted effect is likely to be even more muted with respect to the more 
centrist swing justices.
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A. Changes in the Court’s Deference Signal, 1977-2002
Recall that Cohen and Spitzer claim that their data, weighted according to their 
method, shows relatively low deference signals in the late 1970s, then a spike in the early 
to mid-1980s – where the Court appeared to send much stronger pro-deference signals –
then a decline in the late 1980s.  They interpret this pattern as the result of a conservative 
Supreme Court’s reaction to the rightward shift of the agencies in the early 1980s.  The 
Court reined in the more liberal appellate courts by issuing a series of strongly pro-
deference rulings, but once equilibrium was restored, the overall deference signal 
reverted to more or less where it had been before.75
Below I present graphically the results of my attempt to replicate and extend 
Cohen and Spitzer’s analysis.76 Figure 7 shows the results, for the 1977-2002 period, 
75
 Cite Cohen Spitzer paper.  As noted above, supra TAN 15, Cohen and Spitzer rightly stress that the 
variable of interest is not the absolute magnitude of the Supreme Court’s deference signal, but rather the 
change in that signal over time.  In equilibrium, circuit court judges will take the Supreme Court’s 
preference into account when deciding cases – i.e., circuit judges will consider their utility from deciding 
the case the way they want, their disutility from being reversed (and from deviating from announced 
Supreme Court doctrine), and the probability that the Supreme Court will reverse their decision.  When the 
Supreme Court’s preferred level of deference is known, therefore, circuit court judges will adjust their 
behavior, and the absolute deference signal, whatever it may be, will remain relatively constant.  This 
phenomenon is closely related to the well-known finding that changes in the underlying liability standard 
have no long-term effect on plaintiff win-rates at trial, because the parties adjust their behavior to take the 
new standard into account.  See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J.L. STUD. 1 (1984).
If litigants and circuit court judges could anticipate and perfectly adjust to changes in Supreme Court 
preferences with regard to the appropriate level of deference to agencies, then shifts in Supreme Court 
deference doctrine would never have an observable effect on the deference signal contained in the cases the 
Court actually decides.  However, such perfect and instantaneous adjustment is unlikely in the real world, 
for a few reasons.  First, appeals sometimes take some time to get through the system, so that some appeals 
may be decided before a shift in Supreme Court doctrine has become clear.  (However, as Cohen and 
Spitzer note, in the kinds of public law cases at issue here, the appeals process is often much more rapid 
than it is in other contexts.  See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 460 n.60.)  Second, if 
circuit courts are uncertain about whether a particular Supreme Court case (or set of cases) really represents 
a shift in deference doctrine, the circuit courts’ estimate of the Supreme Court’s preferred deference level 
will be somewhere in between the old standard and the new one.  This means that circuit court decisions 
will shift, but, at least initially, will not shift enough to satisfy the Supreme Court
Therefore, when the Supreme Court changes deference doctrine, the pattern of case decisions is expected 
to be a sustained directional shift in the deference signal for some period of time, until the lower courts 
have internalized the new standard, after which the average deference signal ought to return to its “natural” 
equilibrium level.
76
 However, as noted above, this is not an exact replication, for two reasons.  First, Cohen and Spitzer 
weight their deference signals with a certain number of cert denials, coded as 0.  That is, they use the 
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when using the aggregate reversal-weighted annual deference score, while Figure 8 uses 
the average reversal-weighted deference score.  Of the versions of the analysis that I 
present, these are is the one that seeks to replicate, as faithfully as possible, Cohen and 
Spitzer’s original case-weighting methodology.
[Figure 7 about here]
[Figure 8 about here]
The results in Figure 7 do not look much like what Cohen and Spitzer report, nor 
do they appear terribly consistent with the theory.  For instance, there is a sharp pro-
deference spike in 1978, approximately equal in magnitude to the strong pro-deference 
signal of 1981.  Even more puzzling, there is a two-year decline in the strength of the 
deference signal from 1981 to 1983, exactly the period where Cohen and Spitzer’s 
theory, and the data they report, say we should see a progressively stronger deference 
signal.  Overall, though the deference signal post-1990 seems on average weaker than the 
pre-1990 deference signal, there is no clearly discernible pattern or trend in the data 
sufficient to support any strong conclusions about changing patterns of deference 
doctrine.
Figure 8, showing the average (as opposed to aggregate) deference score, also 
reveals no clear pattern.  The average deference signal appears somewhat more volatile 
after 1989 than beforehand, and there appears to be a significant dip in the 1989-1992 
period, but otherwise there is no indication of systematic changes in deference doctrine.
average deference signal, but “deflate” it by assuming a constant number of certiorari “slots” per year.  
Those slots that are not filled – because the total number of cases decided is less than the number of slots –
are assigned a value of 0 when taking the average.  Instead of following this method, I show the aggregate 
and average deference scores separately.  However, in the interests of greater comparability, I also 
calculated the average deference score “deflated” by presumed cert denials.  Here I use the maximum 
number of cases decided in any year in my sample – 16 – as the ceiling.  (Cohen and Spitzer instead use 
two standard deviations above the average number of cases decided per year, but because, as they note, this 
ceiling is never exceeded in the actual sample, the choice of ceiling makes no difference except with 
respect to the (already arbitrary) absolute magnitude of the signal values.)  Figure 9 compares the average 
deference score – using the Cohen-Spitzer weighting scheme – with the deference score when the values 
are “deflated” by dividing the aggregate signal not by the number of cases decided, but by 16 – the 
maximum number of cases decided in any given year.
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[Figure 9 about here]
The inconsistency of Cohen and Spitzer’s findings with my attempt at replication 
is puzzling.  Clearly, the difference in results arises from differences in what we chose to 
include in our sample, and in the differences in signal aggregation methodology.  
However, because Cohen and Spitzer’s data is not publicly available, I cannot ascertain 
the exact reasons for this divergence.
I next consider the annual deference score when applying the unweighted and 
influence-weighted methods.  These results are presented graphically in Figure 10 and 
Figure 11.  Figure 10 presents the results for the aggregate score, while Figure 11
presents the average annual deference signal.
[Figure 10 about here]
[Figure 11 about here]
The unweighted scores do not reveal any particularly striking patterns.  However, 
the influence-weighted scores do suggest some potentially interesting trends.  First, 
although there is a lot of noise in the data, the annual aggregate influence-weighted score 
– like the aggregate reversal-weighted score – appears to show a stronger pro-deference 
signal in the 1977-1988 period than in the 1989-2002 period.  Second, and perhaps most 
interestingly, the average annual influence-weighted deference score suggests the 
following pattern: a decline in the late 1970s, an increase from about 1981 to about 1985, 
a decrease from 1985 to 1990, another increase from 1990 to about 1995, and then 
another decrease from 1995 to 2001.  These two patterns – a drop and level-off in the 
aggregate deference signal, and a “double hump” in the average deference signal, are 
somewhat easier to see by taking a multi-year moving average of the influence-weighted 
deference signal.  Two- and four-year moving averages are depicted for the aggregate and 
average influence-weighted deference signals in Figure 12 and Figure 13.
[Figure 12 about here]
[Figure 13 about here]
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The drop and level-off in the aggregate deference signal may have more to do 
with a decline in the total number of cases heard by the Supreme Court than anything 
else.  As Table 6 and Figure 14 demonstrate, the number of cases heard by the Court each 
Term has dropped substantially.  Any methodology that implicitly presumes a roughly 
constant number of potential slots on the Court’s docket, as both the aggregate signal 
method and Cohen and Spitzer’s deflation method do, is therefore likely to exaggerate the 
strength of the signal in the early years in the sample relative to the later years.
[Table 6 about here]
[Figure 14 about here]
The “double hump” evident in the average deference signal is therefore the more 
interesting and intriguing pattern in the data, and potential explanations for this 
phenomenon will be considered below.77  More generally, both the aggregate and average 
deference signals that I find are fundamentally inconsistent with Cohen and Spitzer’s 
theory, and their own predictions about patterns of deference doctrine in the Clinton 
years.
B. Additional Tests: Different Agencies, Different Circuits, Different 
Justices
1. Executive agencies vs. Independent Agencies
According to the Cohen-Spitzer theory, politically-motivated changes in Supreme 
Court deference doctrine ought to be more pronounced with respect to executive branch 
agencies than with respect to independent agencies.  The reason, as Cohen and Spitzer 
explain, is that executive branch agencies are more responsive to the political ideology of 
77 See infra Part IV.B.
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the president than are the independent agencies, which tend to be more insulated.78  Thus, 
in the early to mid-1980s, the theory would predict that the Supreme Court would send 
stronger pro-deference signals where executive agencies were involved; the pro-
deference stance vis-à-vis independent agencies ought to be (relatively) weaker.  This is 
what Cohen and Spitzer claim to find in the data.79  Moreover, in the Clinton years, 
Cohen and Spitzer’s predicted contraction of deference doctrine ought to manifest itself 
primarily in cases involving executive agencies.
Before proceeding to the empirical results, it’s worth noting a potential theoretical 
problem with this prediction.  The doctrinal formulations in most of the cases under 
consideration are not specific to one type of agency or another.  Legal principles and tests 
established in cases involving executive agencies are frequently applied in subsequent 
cases involving independent agencies, and vice versa.  For example, Verizon v. FCC80
raised an issue of how much deference was due the FCC, an independent agency, but the 
case relied on the framework established by Chevron, which involved deference to an 
executive agency – the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  And, the Vermont 
Yankee case involved judicial review of the decisions of an independent agency – the 
Atomic Energy Commission – but the important principle established by Vermont Yankee
(that federal courts may not impose procedural requirements on agencies beyond those 
established by the Administrative Procedure Act) was subsequently cited in numerous 
cases involving executive agencies.81  Inasmuch as the Cohen-Spitzer theory stresses the 
signals the Supreme Court sends to lower courts about how circuit judges ought to 
resolve future cases, the hypothesis of a significant difference between how the Supreme 
Court treats executive agencies and independent agencies turns on an implicit and 
78 See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 447, 450-51.
79 See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 460-66.
80
 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
81 See, e.g., Gonzalez-Oropeza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying Vermont 
Yankee to INS); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. U.S. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(applying Vermont Yankee to EPA); Guitard v. U.S. Sec. of Navy, 967 F.2d 737, 742 (2nd Cir. 1992) 
(applying Vermont Yankee to Navy).
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contestable proposition that the lower courts can discern different standards applied to 
each by the Supreme Court, even when the Court does not make such discrimination 
explicit.
In order to test the hypothesis that changes in Supreme Court deference doctrine 
manifest themselves primarily in cases involving executive agencies, I bifurcated my 
sample into two groups based on the status of the agency involved.  Of the 221 cases in 
the sample, 125 involved executive agencies, and the other 96 involved independent 
agencies.  Using the influence-weighted deference scores – which, for reasons described 
above, I believe are the most reliable – I calculated the annual aggregate and average 
deference scores.82  These are depicted below in Figure 15 and Figure 16.
[Figure 15 about here]
[Figure 16 about here]
These figures provide little support for the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis that their 
rational choice theory of deference doctrine obtains primarily with respect to executive 
agencies, and is more muted with respect to independent agencies.  It is true that the level 
of deference (both aggregate and average) accorded executive agencies was greater than 
that accorded independent agencies in 1983-1986.  However, in 1981-1982, the average 
deference signal was actually greater for independent agencies than executive agencies, 
contrary to what the theory would predict.  More importantly, in the Clinton years the 
deference signal associated with cases involving executive agencies was also consistently 
stronger than the deference signal associated with independent agency cases.  Indeed, the 
results suggest that the overall pattern of change in deference doctrine observed in the 
Clinton years is driven primarily by cases demanding greater deference to executive 
agencies – in stark contrast to what the Cohen-Spitzer theory would predict.
82
 Though I only report the influence-weighted score results, I checked the unweighted and reversal-
weighted annual and aggregate scores as well.  No significant patterns appeared.
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The finding that, on the whole, the Court appears to accord less deference in cases 
involving independent agencies than it does in cases involving executive agencies may 
seem counterintuitive.  After all, independent agencies are presumably more ideologically 
moderate than agencies under the president’s control, and thus courts might be expected 
to be more aggressive when reviewing executive agency action and more deferential to 
the independent commissions.  There are several possible reasons why the opposite 
appears to be the case.
First, the apparent “independent agency effect” (i.e., lower average deference in 
independent agency cases) may arise from the subject matter of the independent agency 
cases – in particular, it may have to do with labor and employment law.  Over one-third 
of the independent agency cases in the sample (33 of 96) involved either the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (27 cases) or the Federal Labor Relations Authority 
(FLRA) (six cases).  The second- and third-place independent agencies, by total number 
of cases raising a deference issue, were the FCC (16 cases) and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (11 cases); no other independent agency appears in the 
data set more than six times.  Therefore, if there is something about labor and 
employment law cases – either in terms of their politics or the doctrinal posture in which 
deference issues tend to arise in such cases – that is conducive to lower levels of judicial 
deference, the apparent “independent agency effect” may in fact be a “labor law effect.”83
83
 According to Elizabeth Garrett, a number of scholars have “noted that the National Labor Relations 
Board seems to be given less deference [than other agencies], in part because of its preference to make 
policy through adjudication and not rulemaking but also because its reputation makes it suspect in some 
quarters.”  Elizabeth Garret, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH L. REV. ??, ?? (2003).  Interestingly, decisions 
involving agencies that deal with employees’ rights (both individually and collectively) appear to get less 
judicial deference than other agency decisions, independent of whether the agencies are independent or 
under presidential control.  Of the agencies in the sample, seven were involved in ten or more Supreme 
Court cases in which the Court sent a signal as to the appropriate level of judicial deference – HHS/HEW, 
EPA (and Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)), FCC, Treasury, NLRB, EEOC, and Labor (including 
OSHA and OWCP).  The proportion of cases in which the Court sent a pro-deference signal for each of 
these agencies are: 82.8% for HHS (24 of 29 cases); 80% for EPA (8 of 10 cases); 76.9% for FCC (10 of 
13 cases); 71.4% for Treasury (10 of 14 cases); 61.5% for NLRB (16 of 26 cases); 50% for EEOC (6 of 12 
cases); and 38.5% for Labor (5 of 13 cases).
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Another potential explanation, explored in greater detail below,84 is that lower 
courts tend systematically to underestimate the amount of deference that they ought to 
accord to new presidential initiatives.  That is, it may be that when new presidents pursue 
dramatic policy changes through executive agency decisions, lower courts are too quick 
(from the Supreme Court’s point of view) to invalidate those actions.  In contrast, lower 
courts may be better at estimating the appropriate level of deference due to independent 
agencies, and so the Supreme Court need not send as many strong pro-deference signals.  
On this point, note that the data showing a consistently weaker pro-deference signal in 
independent agency cases does not necessarily indicate that the Supreme Court wants the 
circuit courts to apply a lower absolute level of scrutiny to independent agencies than to 
executive agencies.  Instead, the argument is that lower courts are better at estimating and 
applying the appropriate level of deference to independent agencies, and therefore strong 
signals from the Supreme Court are not as necessary.
Whatever the explanation, the results regarding executive and independent 
agencies suggest that Cohen and Spitzer’s finding that the deference spike in the early 
1980s was considerably more pronounced with respect to executive agencies than 
independent agencies, even if an accurate as an empirical matter, does not necessarily 
support their explanation for changes in Supreme Court deference doctrine.  Instead, it 
appears that pro-deference signals in independent agency cases are generally weaker 
throughout the sample period, and the spike in deference during the Clinton years – the 
strongest empirical evidence against the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis – is actually stronger
when only executive agency cases are considered.
2. Circuit Court Ideology
84 See infra Part IV.B.1.
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As discussed above, although there are general national trends in the ideological 
composition of the federal appellate bench, there is considerably inter-circuit ideological 
variation as well.85  Therefore, it may be that the Supreme Court sends different signals 
about the appropriate level of judicial deference to different circuits.  In particular, a 
hypothesis consistent with the Cohen-Spitzer theory – though not a hypothesis advanced 
by Cohen and Spitzer themselves – is that a conservative Supreme Court in a Republican 
administration will send stronger pro-deference signals in cases from liberal circuits than 
it will in cases from conservative circuits, while under a Democratic administration a 
conservative Supreme Court will send stronger anti-deference signals to the conservative 
circuits.  Thus, the hypothesis would predict that the Supreme Court should send stronger 
pro-deference signals to liberal courts than conservative courts throughout the sample 
period.
This hypothesis makes a number of assumptions.  First, as seems likely, the 
ideological predilections of the different circuits must be known both to the judges on the 
different circuits and to the justices of the Supreme Court.  Second, the hypothesis 
assumes not only that the Supreme Court’s doctrinal pronouncements, though 
purportedly universal, vary depending on the lower court’s political leanings, but also 
that lower court judges are sensitive enough to this phenomenon to react more markedly 
to a pro- or anti-deference signal sent to the judge’s own circuit, or to an ideologically 
similar circuits, than to a circuit on the opposite end of the political spectrum.
To test the hypothesis that the ideology of the circuit of origin makes a difference, 
I subdivided the original 221 cases into those decisions involving a “liberal” circuit 
(defined as a circuit with a mean judicial ideology score of -0.1 or below), those 
involving a “conservative” circuit (mean judicial ideology of 0.1 or above), and those 
involving either a moderate circuit, a district court, a state supreme court, or Supreme 
85 See supra TAN 27.
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Court original jurisdiction.  Of the 221 cases in the original sample, 96 (43.4%) reviewed 
a decision by a liberal circuit, 59 (26.7%) reviewed a conservative circuit decision, and 
the remaining 66 (29.9%) fell into the residual category.
Unfortunately (at least from a research perspective), the liberal and conservative 
circuit court cases cluster in different time periods.  For instance, none of the circuit 
courts were conservative (by my calculation) until the mid-1980s, and so the first review 
of a conservative circuit’s decision on a judicial deference issue does not appear until 
1985.  Similarly, no circuit other than the 11th Circuit was liberal from 1990 to 1996, and 
so no liberal circuit cases appear in the sample in the 1991-1995 period.  I therefore 
concentrate on the deference signal sent in those years in the sample when there was the 
most inter-circuit ideological variation – 1985-1991 and 1996-2002.  This is obviously 
problematic, since the two most important transition periods – Reagan and Clinton’s first 
terms – are omitted.  Nonetheless, the data are suggestive, and provides little support for 
the hypothesis that the Supreme Court treats liberal and conservative circuits differently.
As Figure 21 and Figure 22 demonstrate, the average deference signal sent by the 
Court to liberal and conservative circuits tends to track almost exactly.86  Moreover, 
precisely because there were hardly any liberal circuit court decisions to review in the 
1991-1995 period, the spike in judicial deference during that period is partially 
attributable to pro-deference signals sent to conservative circuits, in apparent 
contradiction to the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis.  Figure 23 confirms that the Supreme 
Court sent strong pro-deference signals, with a generally increasing trend, to conservative 
circuits throughout the 1990s.  The Supreme Court only shifted to signaling less 
deference to agencies after the election of George W. Bush – again exactly the opposite 
of what the Cohen-Spitzer theory predicts.
86
 Supreme Court appears to send somewhat different signals is 1997-1998, but this result may be driven by 
a single case, Dunn v. CFTC.  This case was the only one in the 1997-1998 period that involved an appeal 
from a liberal circuit, and it called for less judicial deference.
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[Figure 21 about here]
[Figure 22 about here]
[Figure 23 about here]
3. Individual Justices: Stevens vs. Rehnquist
The preceding attempts to reproduce and extend Cohen and Spitzer’s test of their 
rational choice theory of judicial deference yielded results apparently inconsistent with 
that theory.  The relatively high levels of deference conferred on Carter-era 
administrative agencies make the pro-deference cases decided in the early 1980s seem 
like less of a dramatic shift in deference doctrine than the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis 
implied.  And, under Clinton, the level of deference called for by the Supreme Court 
appears to have expanded (or at least held steady), in apparent contradiction of the 
Cohen-Spitzer rational choice model’s prediction.
However, even if the predicted effect is not apparent with respect to the Court’s 
collective decisions, it may be discernable in the votes of individual justices.  That is, it 
may be that the swing voters on the Court (e.g., Stewart, Powell, O’Connor, Kennedy) 
are sufficiently centrist that political calculations of the sort Cohen and Spitzer describe 
have little or no influence on their votes, but that the more ideologically extreme 
members of the Court are likely, as per the Cohen-Spitzer theory, to vote to expand 
deference doctrine when the circuit courts are less politically congenial than the agencies, 
and to contract deference doctrine when the situation is reversed.
I conduct a preliminary test of this alternative version of the hypothesis by 
looking at the difference in voting patterns of Justice Stevens and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.  Both of these justices were on the Court throughout the entire sample period, 
and they are generally considered to occupy opposite ends of the ideological spectrum.  
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The Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis would predict that the conservative Chief Justice 
Rehnquist would be more likely than the liberal Justice Stevens to call for greater judicial 
deference to agency decisions during the Reagan and Bush administrations, but more 
likely to call for more aggressive judicial scrutiny of agency decisions under Carter and 
Clinton.
In order to evaluate this hypothesis, I examined a subset of the original dataset 
containing only those cases in which Justices Stevens and Rehnquist reached different 
conclusions about the degree of deference due to an administrative agency.87  Of the 
original 221 cases, 80 (36.2%) involved significant differences of opinion between 
Rehnquist and Stevens on the deference question.  These 80 cases, along with how each 
of the two justices voted on the deference issue, are listed in Appendix E.  Using the 
citation-weighting methodology described above, I calculated Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
average influence-weighted deference signal, using only the cases where he and Justice 
Stevens disagreed, for each of the 26 years in the sample.88  This value represents the 
difference between Justice Rehnquist’s pro-deference signal and Justice Stevens’ pro-
deference signal, with positive numbers indicating that, in the cases where they diverged, 
Rehnquist was more likely to call for high levels of deference than Stevens, and negative 
numbers indicating that Stevens was the more deferential of the two.
In contrast to the results for the Court as a whole, the results of a comparison of 
Stevens and Rehnquist are strongly supportive of the Cohen-Spitzer rational choice 
hypothesis.  As is clear from Figure 24, Figure 25, and Figure 26 below – which show, 
87
 For the most part, these cases are those in which one of the two justices joins the majority while the other 
one dissents.  However, in some cases on of the two concurred but resolved the deference issue differently. 
These cases were included in the set of cases where the two diverged.   In other cases the dissenting justice 
dissented on some point unrelated to the deference issue; these cases where not included in the subset of 
divergent cases.
88
 Where Rehnquist dissented on the deference issue, I reversed the sign on the influence score that the case 
otherwise would have received.  So, for example, US v. O’Hagan (1997) (with Justice Stevens in the 
majority) came out pro-deference with an citation-weighted influence factor of 0.456.  Since Rehnquist was 
in dissent, I assign the case a value of –0.456 when calculating the pro-deference signal of Rehnquist’s 
voting behavior.
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respectively, the annual, two-year, and four-year average difference between Rehnquist’s 
and Stevens’ influence-weighted deference signal – Rehnquist consistently voted for 
more deference than Stevens from about 1979-1987, and Stevens consistently voted for 
more deference than Rehnquist from about 1994-2000.89
[Figure 24 about here]
[Figure 25 about here]
[Figure 26 about here]
Though these results are consistent with the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis, their 
strength as evidence is mitigated by a number of considerations.  First, as noted above, 
Rehnquist and Stevens disagreed in only about a third of the cases in the sample, meaning 
that even for relatively more extreme judges, the hypothesized effect is small.  For the 
more centrist swing voters, the effect is likely to be even weaker.  Second, Rehnquist and 
Stevens may not be representative of conservative and liberal justices more generally; a 
more thorough assessment will require the examination of the votes of other justices, 
beyond the scope of this study.  Third, Rehnquist and Stevens may simply be voting on 
individual case outcomes, rather than broader issues of appropriate deference.  That is, 
Rehnquist may vote the pro-deference line in the 1980s because the cases that come up 
involve conservative agencies doing conservative things, but he votes anti-deference in 
the 1990s because the cases involve liberal agency policy choices.90
IV. Discussion
89
 The pattern in the 1988-1993 period, and in 2001-2002, is more ambiguous.
90
 Indeed, one might make this point more broadly about Cohen and Spitzer’s results.  The best way to test 
the hypothesis would be to find cases where the agency action under review was ideologically divergent 
from the norm.  Such additional tests would be extremely valuable, but they are beyond the scope of the 
present study.
Stephenson – Judicial Deference Draft 7/13/2004 47
A. Accounting for a Null Finding
The analysis above yields few clear-cut conclusions.  Indeed, the strongest result 
is a null finding – I generally do not observe the patterns that Cohen and Spitzer predict, 
especially in the period outside their original sample.  Moreover, there is a great deal of 
“noise” in the results, and considerable inconsistency between different techniques for 
measuring the strength of the deference signal in different years.  This lack of robustness 
further calls Cohen and Spitzer’s original findings into question. 
One possible explanation of these null findings is that the Cohen-Spitzer 
hypothesis – that shifting Supreme Court-circuit court- administrative agency ideological 
alignments influence deference doctrine because the Supreme Court seeks to maximize 
its policy satisfaction – though logical, parsimonious, and intuitively appealing in many 
respects, is simply incorrect as an empirical matter.  The Supreme Court’s deference 
doctrine may instead be determined by other factors, it may reflect normative or doctrinal 
commitments independent of short-term policy results, or it may be as confused and 
inconsistent as some observers have charged.  Thus, the null finding reported here may be 
useful inasmuch as it might prompt additional research – especially by legal scholars 
interested in social scientific analysis of judicial behavior – into alternative explanations 
for the Supreme Court’s decisions on cases that raise issues of judicial deference to 
administrative agencies.91
Another possibility is that the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis is basically correct, but 
the postulated effect cannot be observed by looking at the simple trend lines that Cohen 
and Spitzer and I report.  There are at least three reasons why this might be the case.  
First, the predicted patterns may not be discernible because of methodological errors in 
91
 It is worth stressing that such a conclusion would not necessarily entail a rejection of applying rational 
choice theory to Supreme Court decision-making as such.  Rather, it may be that the rational choice 
framework remains the most useful approach to analyzing Court behavior, but presumptions about judicial 
utility functions and institutional context must be re-examined.
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sample selection and measurement.  While I have endeavored to explain as clearly as 
possible the rationale and justification for my decisions on these methodology issues, 
other scholars may find my choices problematic.  I therefore leave open the possibility 
that the predicted effect does not emerge because I have not correctly calculated the 
Court’s deference signal, though this possibility seems to me an unlikely explanation for 
the apparent lack of confirmation of the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis.92
Second, recall that the deference signal sent by the Supreme Court should be 
relatively constant in equilibrium because Supreme Court preferences are anticipated by 
litigants and lower court judges, who adjust their behavior accordingly.  Both Cohen and 
Spitzer and I assume that this adjustment will not be instantaneous, and that there will 
therefore be a period of a few years when the Supreme Court will have to intensify its 
signals in one direction or another in order to induce the return to equilibrium.  But it is 
theoretically possible that the lower court’s adjustment occurs instantaneously, or at least 
sufficiently quickly that no clear Supreme Court signal is observable in data of the sort 
examined here.93
Third, it might be the case that political calculations of the sort Cohen and Spitzer 
hypothesize are only one influence among many, and so cannot be detected by looking at 
simple trends in the deference signal independent of other potentially important variables.  
Neither Cohen and Spitzer’s original studies, nor my attempts at re-evaluation and 
extension, perform a multivariate analysis that controls for other potential influences on 
Supreme Court deference doctrine.  The main reason for this is that the hypothesis as 
92
 Another type of measurement problem may arise if my assumptions about agency ideology, circuit court 
ideology, and Supreme Court ideology are incorrect.  For instance, agencies may be more responsive to 
congressional control than presidential control, or their behavior may be relatively insensitive to changes in 
presidential administration.  Or, the measurement of circuit court ideology may be sufficiently inaccurate 
that, contrary to my assumptions, the circuit courts were not much more liberal in the 1980s than they were 
in the 1990s. These possibilities seem highly unlikely, but they cannot be ruled out entirely.
93
 It is also possible that lower courts might over-estimate as well as under-estimate the amount of change 
in deference doctrine the Supreme Court desires.  This could further confound the results, in that increases 
in deference doctrine might actually indicate a period when the Court wants less deference than it did in an 
earlier period.  However, though such overreactions are conceptually possible, they seem unlikely.
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originally advanced by Cohen and Spitzer implied that the effect would be strong enough 
to determine the pattern of Supreme Court deference doctrine without controlling for 
other variables.  It may be the case that such a prediction grossly exaggerated the strength 
of the predicted effect, but that the hypothesized influence of political alignments is 
nonetheless valid at the margins, and would be observable through a more rigorous 
multivariate empirical test.  Such a multivariate analysis would be challenging because of 
the small number of cases, the difficulty of correctly specifying the model, and the 
potentially large number of candidate control variables.  Nonetheless, though such a 
study is beyond the scope of this paper, it is an important item on the future research 
agenda.
B. Accounting for Apparent Patterns: What Explains the “Double 
Hump”?
The main conclusions of this study are negative – though the different coding, 
weighting, and aggregation methods yield somewhat different results, none of them 
clearly confirms the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis, and almost all of them are in fact 
disconfirmatory to some degree.  However, some patterns do seem to appear in the data, 
and, though not especially robust, these patterns invite preliminary attempts at 
explanation.  The most interesting such pattern is the apparent “double hump” in the 
average deference signal over the 1977-2002 period: there appears to be a spike in the 
early 1980s and a decline in the mid-to-late 1980s, and a second spike in the early-to-mid 
1990s, with a decline in the late 1990s.  While remaining duly mindful that this apparent 
“pattern” may be a coincidence or the result of flawed aggregation techniques, it is 
nonetheless useful to consider some potential reasons such a pattern might appear, and 
the additional hypotheses that such explanations would imply.
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1. The “Presidential Mandates” Hypothesis – Regulatory 
Reversals and Circuit Court Overreactions
The most striking aspect of the “double hump” pattern is that the deference spikes 
occur primarily in the first presidential term following a change in the partisan control of 
the executive.  That is, the data suggests that, after the election of a new president of a 
new political party, the Supreme Court tends to send increasingly pro-deference signals 
for several years, with the trend reversing in the latter half of the president’s time in 
office.  Why might this be the case?
It may be that the Supreme Court has relatively constant preferences with regard 
to the appropriate level of judicial deference, but the circuit courts consistently 
underestimate the degree to which they ought to defer to administrative decisions that 
appear to represent dramatic changes in policy.94  If agency actions that appear to 
represent significant departures from past practice are more prone to invalidation at the 
circuit court level, but the Supreme Court is not significantly more likely to desire 
invalidation of such actions, then the election of a new president with a new regulatory 
agenda is especially likely to trigger instructions from the Supreme Court that the lower 
courts should treat agency action more deferentially.  That is, the Supreme Court may be 
more willing than the circuit courts to recognize a presidential “mandate” to effect 
substantial changes in regulatory policy.  This result is not necessarily inconsistent with a 
rational choice perspective on deference doctrine, but it makes different assumptions than 
the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis about the Supreme Court’s preferences.  The “presidential 
94
 There may be rationalist explanations as to why circuit court judges would consistently misestimate the 
Supreme Court’s preferences in this way, or it may reflect some kind of cognitive limitation.  Or, it may be 
that only a minority of circuit court judges behave in this way, but plaintiffs challenging controversial 
administrative action may be able to engage in forum shopping, increasing the chances that these cases will 
be heard before circuit judges who are more prone than their brethren on other circuits or the Supreme 
Court to strike down the agency action in question.
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mandate” theory has the additional advantage of better explaining the findings regarding 
the difference in the Court’s treatment of executive and independent agency cases.
The “presidential mandate” hypothesis implies a clear prediction for what ought 
to happen under George W. Bush: there ought to be another deference spike between 
about 2002-2004.  If Bush wins a second term, the trend would then be expected to 
reverse, with increasingly anti-deference signals into 2008.  If a Democrat wins the 2004 
election, we would expect strongly pro-deference signals in the 2005-2008 period.  The 
presidential mandate hypothesis also implies clear out-of-sample predictions for earlier 
periods.  For example, one ought to observe a spike in deference during the first Nixon 
administration, a decline under Ford, and perhaps a spike in the Carter administration as 
well – though the fact that Carter was only a one-term president might make the pattern 
harder to discern.
2. The “Goldilocks” Hypothesis – Supreme Court Centrism and 
Circuit Court Extremism
Another possible explanation for the double hump pattern suggested by the data is 
that the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis is generally correct about the Supreme Court’s 
instrumentalist, policy-oriented strategy, but errs with regard to its assumptions about the 
Court’s political preferences.  It may be that the Supreme Court was relatively moderate 
throughout the relevant sample period.  When the circuit courts are similarly moderate, 
the Court contracted the level of judicial deference, authorizing more vigorous judicial 
scrutiny.  But, when the circuit courts tended to be ideologically extreme – in either
direction – the Supreme Court signaled the need for greater judicial deference to 
administrative agency decisions. 
This hypothesis may find some support in the observation that the two periods 
when the Supreme Court appeared to send the most anti-deference signals – 1989-1992 
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and 1999-2002 – correspond to roughly similar average circuit court judge ideology 
scores (+0.128, for 1989-1992; -0.025 for 1999-2002).  (These numbers are highly 
inexact measurements of true ideology, so extreme caution ought to be exercised in their 
interpretation.)  More qualitatively, the trends with regard to circuit court ideology 
suggest that in the 1989-1992 period, the circuits had recently become relatively 
moderate after a sustained period of marked liberalism, and in the 1999-2002 period the 
circuits had again become relatively moderate, this time after several years of being quite 
conservative.  While hardly conclusive, this evidence is suggestive support for the 
hypothesis of a relatively centrist Supreme Court (or swing justices), willing to contract 
deference doctrine when the circuit courts are relatively centrist as well, but likely to 
expand deference doctrine whenever the circuit courts are anything other than a roughly 
equal mix of liberals and conservatives.  Thus, the circuit courts in the early Reagan years 
were too liberal, the circuit courts in the early Clinton years were too conservative, but 
during both Bush administrations, the courts were (ideologically) just right.  This 
hypothesis has the additional attractive feature of being able to account for why the 
Cohen-Spitzer theory seems to do a better job explaining the divergence in Rehnquist and 
Stevens’ votes than it does explaining the voting patterns of the Court as a whole.
Discerning the predictions of this hypothesis for the latter part of George W. 
Bush’s presidency requires making some assumptions about how rapidly Bush will be 
able to shift the ideology of the circuit courts.  If, as seems likely, it will take some time 
before the circuits become substantially more conservative, then the hypothesis would 
predict no significant expansion in deference doctrine during Bush’s first term.  The 
predictions for a second Bush term, if it comes to pass, would be more ambiguous.  On 
the one hand, the circuits by then may have become too conservative for the Supreme 
Court’s liking, which might imply increasingly pro-deference signals.  On the other hand, 
the Court’s own ideological preferences may have shifted by then, since it is almost 
certain that some members of the current Court will be replaced before 2008.  Also, even 
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if the circuit courts become more conservative under Bush, they might still be 
ideologically closer to the Supreme Court than the Bush executive agencies, which would 
imply that the Court would continue to favor less judicial deference.  If a Democrat wins 
in 2008, then, presuming this partisan alternation keeps the balance in the circuit courts 
roughly even, we would expect the Supreme Court to continue to send relatively weak 
deference signals.
The foregoing discussion indicates that the two most plausible explanations for 
the “double hump” deference pattern that emerges in the data imply sharply divergent 
predictions about what ought to happen in the next several years.  If the presidential 
mandates theory is correct, we would expect to see a notable expansion in deference 
signals in 2003-2004, and perhaps into the early years of a second Bush term, if there is 
one.  If a Democrat wins the 2004 election, we would also expect relatively strong pro-
deference signals in this period.  If the Supreme Court centrism theory is correct, we 
should expect the Court to maintain the low-deference signals during this period, 
especially during Bush’s first term.  Stronger pro-deference signals would be expected in 
a second Bush term unless Bush is able to move the ideology of the Supreme Court 
markedly to the right (say, if O’Connor or Stevens leave the Court).  In contrast, the 
goldilocks hypothesis would predict continuing low-deference signals if a Democrat 
takes office in 2004.
CONCLUSION
Shifting patterns in Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the appropriate 
level of judicial scrutiny of administrative agency actions presents a puzzle for legal 
scholars and social scientists interested in judicial behavior.  Why is it that at certain 
times the Court appears to stress the importance of judicial deference and restraint, but at 
other points the Court’s opinions seem more sympathetic to aggressive judicial review of 
agency decisions?  Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer, drawing on the methodology of 
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rational choice and the literature on judicial politics, developed a simple, compelling 
explanation for the Court’s behavior: the Court seeks to ensure favorable policy outcomes 
by calling for deference when the agencies are more closely ideologically aligned with 
the Supreme Court than the lower federal courts, but the Court calls for more searching 
judicial review when the circuit courts are more ideologically similar to the Supreme 
Court than the agencies are.  Considerations of relative political alignment, Cohen and 
Spitzer implicitly claimed, could explain observable shifts in deference doctrine even 
without controlling for other factors.
In this paper, I attempt to advance the research agenda on this topic by re-
assessing the Cohen-Spitzer theory, in particular by testing their explicit out-of-sample 
predictions about deference doctrine during the Clinton administration.  I find little 
evidence to support the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis, at least in the strong form in which 
Cohen and Spitzer originally presented it.  Rather than a contraction of deference doctrine 
in the 1990s, there seems to be a significant expansion, comparable to the expansion that 
took place in the mid-1980s.  While this observation does not necessarily refute the 
Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis, it invites deep skepticism and demonstrates the need for 
reexamination of our assumptions and theories about the politics of administrative law 
decision-making in the Supreme Court.
I consider two possible alternative theories that are more consistent with the data I 
report than the original version of the Cohen-Spitzer thesis.  First, it may be that spikes in 
deference tend to correspond with the election of a new president of a different party, 
because shifts in partisan control of the executive tend to generate cases of the type where 
lower federal courts are excessively likely (from the Supreme Court’s perspective) to 
invalidate agency action.  Second, it may be that spikes in deference correspond to 
periods when the circuit courts become ideologically extreme in either direction, but the 
Supreme Court contracts deference doctrine when the circuits are more moderate –
perhaps reflecting the relatively centrist position of the Supreme Court.  These two 
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hypotheses (which are by no means exhaustive) imply different predictions for what is 
likely to happen in the years after my sample period ends.  If the presidential mandates 
theory is correct, deference should expand in 2003-2004.  If the Supreme Court centrism 
theory is correct, then deference should probably stay at about the same low level as in 
2001-2002.
The most important objective of this paper is to re-open a line of inquiry that 
many considered more or less closed after Cohen and Spitzer published their influential 
papers on the subject.  Future research should make use of more sophisticated 
methodological techniques than those employed here, and should explore more nuanced 
hypotheses, in order to better understand the political, ideological, and institutional forces 
that shape Supreme Court deference doctrine.
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Table 2
Year Average Circuit Judge Ideology Year Average Circuit Judge Ideology
1977 -0.15 1990 +0.11
1978 -0.23 1991 +0.14
1979 -0.27 1992 +0.19
1980 -0.43 1993 +0.21
1981 -0.46 1994 +0.16
1982 -0.35 1995 +0.13
1983 -0.31 1996 +0.11
1984 -0.25 1997 +0.09
1985 -0.17 1998 +0.05
1986 -0.04 1999 +0.04
1987 -0.01 2000 -0.02
1988 +0.04 2001 -0.03
1989 +0.07 2002 -0.00
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Table 3
Ideology Score
Justice Cohen-Spitzer Segel-Cover Bailey Martin-Quinn
Marshall -1 (1-4) -1.00 (1-2) -0.503 (1) -2.002 (1)
Brennan 0.7 (5-14) -1.00 (1-2) -0.405 (2) -1.643 (2)
Stevens 0.7 (5-14) 0.50 (10) -0.312 (3) -0.553 (3)
Ginsburg -1 (1-4) -0.36 (4) -0.270 (4) -0.227 (4)
Breyer -1 (1-4) 0.05 (6) -0.229 (5) -0.180 (5)
Blackmun 0.7 (5-14) 0.77 (13-14) -0.053 (7) -0.073 (6)
Souter 0.7 (5-14) 0.34 (9) -0.204 (6) 0.209 (7)
Stewart 0.7 (5-14) -0.50 (3) 0.099 (8) 0.403 (8)
White -1 (1-4) 0.00 (5) 0.145 (9) 0.407 (9)
Powell 0.7 (5-14) 0.67 (11) 0.203 (11-12) 0.809 (10)
Kennedy 0.7 (5-14) 0.27 (8) 0.203 (11-12) 1.293 (11)
O’Connor 1 (15-16) 0.17 (7) 0.191 (10) 1.309 (12)
Burger 0.7 (5-14) 0.77 (13-14) 0.354 (14) 1.468 (13)
Scalia 1 (15-16) 1.00 (16) 0.317 (13) 2.433 (14)
Rehnquist 0.7 (5-14) 0.91 (15) 0.427 (16) 2.914 (15)
Thomas 0.7 (5-14) 0.68 (12) 0.372 (15) 3.909 (16)
First number represents cardinal ideology score.  Number in parentheses represents 
ordinal ideological ranking, with (1) meaning most liberal justice of the sixteen, and 
(16) meaning most conservative justice.  More than one number in parentheses 
indicates multiple judges with the same cardinal score.
Sign on Segal-Cover scores are opposite of those in original source, so that for all 
four measures higher numbers indicate more conservative ideology.
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Table 4
Median (Mean) Supreme Court Ideology Score
Court Cohen-Spitzer Segel-Cover Bailey Martin-Quinn
1977-1981 0.7 (0.322) 0.5 (0.124) 0.099 (-0.005) 0.403 (0.192)
Stewart departs July 3, 1981; O’Connor sworn in Sept. 25, 1981
1982-1986 0.7 (0.356) 0.5 (0.199) 0.145 (0.005) 0.407 (0.293)
Burger departs Sept. 26, 1986; Scalia sworn in Sept. 26, 1986
1987 0.7 (0.389) 0.5 (0.224) 0.145 (0.001) 0.407 (0.400)
Powell departs June 26, 1987; Kennedy sworn in Feb. 18, 1988
1988-1990 0.7 (0.389) 0.27 (0.18) 0.145 (0.001) 0.407 (0.454)
Brennan departs July 20, 1990; Souter sworn in Oct. 9, 1990
1991 0.7 (0.389) 0.34 (0.329) 0.145 (0.023) 0.407 (0.660)
Marshall departs Oct. 1, 1991; Thomas sworn in Oct. 23 1991
1992-1993 0.7 (0.578) 0.5 (0.516) 0.191 (0.121) 1.293 (1.316)
White departs June 28, 1993; Ginsburg sworn in Aug. 10, 1993
1994 0.7 (0.578) 0.5 (0.476) 0.191 (0.075) 1.293 (1.246)
Blackmun departs Aug. 3, 1994; Breyer sworn in Aug. 3, 1994
1995-2002 0.7 (0.389) 0.34 (0.400) 0.191 (0.055) 1.293 (1.234)
Table 5
Effect on Supreme Court ideology as measured by –















1981-1982 0 0 + + + + + +
1986-1987 0 0 0 0 + + - +
1987-1988 0 - 0 0 0 - 0 +
1990-1991 0 + 0 0 0 + + +
1991-1992 0 + + + + + + +
1993-1994 0 0 0 0 0 - - -
1995-2002 0 - 0 0 - - - -
A “+” indicates that the Supreme Court became more conservative at this transition 
point, according to the specified indicator.
A “-“ indicates that the Supreme Court became more liberal at this transition point, 
according to the specified indicator.
A “0” indicates that the specified indicator finds no change in the Supreme Court’s 
ideology, according to the specified indicator.
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Table 6
Year Number of Supreme Court Cases 
with Full Written Opinion
Year Number of Supreme Court Cases 
with Full Written Opinion
1977 142 1990 139
1978 135 1991 120
1979 138 1992 114
1980 149 1993 114
1981 138 1994 87
1982 167 1995 86
1983 162 1996 75
1984 163 1997 86
1985 151 1998 93
1986 159 1999 81
1987 152 2000 77
1988 142 2001 86
1989 143 2002 81
(Source: Harvard Law Review, annual Supreme Court statistics)
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Figure 1
Figure 2






















1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
DC Cir.
Stephenson – Judicial Deference Draft 7/13/2004 62
Figure 3
Figure 4
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Figure 5
Figure 6
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Figure 7
Figure 8
Reversal-Weighted Aggregate Deference Score (Cohen-Spitzer Method)
Deference Score
Reversal-Weighted Average Deference Score
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Average Deference Score
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Figure 9
Reversal-Weighted Average Deference Score - with and without deflation by 
number of cert denials
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Reversal-Weighted Average Deference Score Reversal-Weighted Average Deference Score (deflated by cert denials)
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Figure 10
Figure 11
Annual Aggregate Deference Score
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Figure 12
Figure 13
Aggregate Influence-Weighted Deference Score [Moving Averages]
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Aggregate Influence-Weighted Deference Score [2-year moving average] Aggregate Influence-Weighted Deference Score [4-year moving average]
Average Influence-Weighted Deference Score [Moving Average]
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Average Inf luence-Weighted Deference Score [4-year moving average]
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Figure 14
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Figure 15
Figure 16
Executive v. Independent Agencies: Annual Aggregate Influence-Weighted Deference Score
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Executive Agencies - Aggeragate Weighted Deference Score Independent Agencies - Aggeragate Weighted Deference Score
Executive v. Independent Agencies: Average Annual Influence-Weighted 
Deference Score
Executive Agencies - Average Weighted Deference Score Independent Agencies - Average Weighted Deference Score
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Figure 17
Figure 18
Executive v Independent Agencies: Aggregate (2-Year Moving Average)
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Executive Agencies - Aggeragate Weighted Deference Score (2yr avg) Independent Agencies - Aggeragate Weighted Deference Score (2yr avg)
Executive v. Independent Agencies: Aggregate (4-Year Moving Average)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Executive Agencies - Aggeragate Weighted Deference Score (4yr avg) Independent Agencies - Aggeragate Weighted Deference Score (4yr avg)
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Figure 19
Figure 20
Executive v. Independent Agencies: Average (2-Year Moving Average)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Executive Agencies - 2-yr Average Weighted Deference Score Independent Agencies - 2-yr Average Weighted Deference Score
Executive v. Independent Agencies: Average (4-Year Moving Average)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Executive Agencies - 4-yr Average Weighted Deference Score Independent Agencies - 4-yr Average Weighted Deference Score
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Figure 21
Figure 22
Liberal v. Conservative Circuits, 1985-1991
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
2-Year  Average Influence-Weighted Deference Score (conservative circuits only)
2-Year Average Influence-Weighted Deference Score (liberal circuits only)
Liberal v. Conservative Circuits, 1996-2002
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
2-Year  Average Influence-Weighted Deference Score (conservative circuits only)
2-Year Average Influence-Weighted Deference Score (liberal circuits only)
Stephenson – Judicial Deference Draft 7/13/2004 73
Figure 23
Two-Year Influence-Weighted Average Deference Score
(Conservative Circuits Only)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
2-Year  Average Influence-Weighted Deference Score (conservative circuits only)
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Figure 24
Figure 25
Difference in Deference Signal - Rehnquist v. Stevens
(Annual Citation-Weighted Averge)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Rehnquist - Stevems deference signal difference
Difference in Deference Signal - Rehnquist v. Stevens
(Two-Year Citation-Weighted Averge)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Rehnquist - Stevens deference signal difference (2yr Avg)
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Figure 26
Difference in Deference Signal - Rehnquist v. Stevens
(Four-Year Citation-Weighted Averge)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Rehnquist - Stevens deference signal difference (4yr Avg)
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APPENDIX A: Complete List of Cases Included in the Sample
2001 TERM
Yellow Transp v. Michigan 123 S.Ct. 371
INS v. Ventura 123 S.Ct. 353
US v. Fior D'Italia 536 U.S. 238
National RR Corp v. Morgan 536 U.S. 101
Chevron v. Echazabal 536 U.S. 73
SEC v. Zandford 535 U.S. 813
Verizon v. FCC 535 U.S. 467
Barnhart v. Walton 535 U.S. 212
Ragsdale v. Wolverine WW 535 U.S. 81
Edelman v. Lynchberg College 535 U.S. 106
New York v. FERC 535 U.S. 1
Wis. Dep of Health v. Blumer 534 U.S. 473
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal 534 U.S. 438
Nat'l Cable & Telecom v. Gulf Power 534 U.S. 327
2000 TERM
Zadvydas v. Davis 533 U.S. 678
INS v. St. Cyr 533 U.S. 289
US v. Mead 533 U.S. 218
NLRB v. KY River Comm. Care 532 U.S. 706
US v. Cleveland Indians 532 U.S. 200
Whitman v. American Trucking 531 U.S. 457
Lopez v. Davis 531 U.S. 230
Sol. Waste Agy v. Army Corps of 
Eng. 531 U.S. 159
1999 TERM
Geier v. American Honda 529 U.S. 861
Christensen v. Harris County 529 U.S. 576
Norfolk Southern v. Shanklin 529 U.S. 344
FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco 529 U.S. 120
Shalala v. Ill Council on Longterm 
Care 529 U.S. 1
1998 TERM
Sutton v. United Air 527 U.S. 471
NASA v. FLRA 527 U.S. 229
Dickinson v. Zurko 527 U.S. 150
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre 526 U.S. 415
US v. Haggar Apparel 526 U.S. 380
Natl Fed of Fed Empl v. Dep of Inter. 526 U.S. 86
Your Home Nursing v. Shalala 525 U.S. 449
AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board 525 U.S. 366
1997 TERM
Bragdon v. Abbott 524 U.S. 624
Atlantic Mut Ins Co v. C.I.R. 523 U.S. 382
Nat'l Credit Union v. 1st Nat'l Bank 522 U.S. 479
Regions Hospital v. Shalala 522 U.S. 448
Allentown Mack Sales v. NLRB 522 U.S. 359
1996 TERM
US v. O'Hagan 521 U.S. 642
US v. LaBonte 520 U.S. 751
Dunn v. CFTC 519 U.S. 465
Auer v. Robbins 519 U.S. 452
1995 TERM
Medtronic v. Lohr 518 U.S. 470
Smiley v. Citibank 517 U.S. 735
Holly Farms v. NLRB 517 U.S. 392
Neal v. US 516 U.S. 284
1994 TERM
NLRB v. Town & Country Electric 516 U.S. 85
Miller v. Johnson 515 U.S. 900
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter 515 U.S. 687
Reno v. Koray 515 U.S. 50
Shalala v. Guernsey Mem. Hosp. 514 U.S. 87
NationsBank v. Variable Annuity 513 U.S. 251
1993 TERM
Brown v. Gardner 513 U.S. 115
Thomas Jefferson U. v. Shalala 512 U.S. 504
OWCP v. Greenwhich Collieries 512 U.S. 267
MCI v. AT&T 512 U.S. 218
PUD No. 1  v. Wash Dep of Ecol 511 U.S. 700
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement 
Co 511 U.S. 571
Chicago v. Environmental Def Fund 511 U.S. 328
ABF Freight v. NLRB 510 U.S. 317
1992 TERM
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala 508 U.S. 402
Lincoln v. Vigil 508 U.S. 182
Reno v. Flores 507 U.S. 292
1991 TERM
Estate of Cowart v. Niklos Drilling 505 U.S. 469
US v. Thompson/Center Arms Co. 504 U.S. 505
US v. Alaska 503 U.S. 569
Natl RR Passenger v. Boston & 
Maine 503 U.S. 407
Arkansas v. Oklahoma 503 U.S. 91
Presley v. Etowah County 502 U.S. 491
Lechmere v. NLRB 502 U.S. 527
INS v. Elias-Zacarias 502 U.S. 478
1990 TERM
INS v. Natl Center for Immigrants 
Rts 502 U.S. 183
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Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines 501 U.S. 680
Gregory v. Ashcroft 501 U.S. 452
Litton Financial Printing v. NLRB 501 U.S. 190
Rust v. Sullivan 500 U.S. 173
American Hosp Assn v. NLRB 499 U.S. 606
Cottage Savings v. CIR 499 U.S. 554
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil 499 U.S. 244
Martin v. OHS Review Comm'n 499 U.S. 144
Mobil Oil v. United Distribution 498 U.S. 211
Demarest v. Manspeaker 498 U.S. 184
1989 TERM
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC 497 U.S. 547
Maislin Industries v. Primary Steel 497 U.S. 116
PBGC v. LTV Corp. 496 U.S. 633
Fort Stewart Schools v. FLRA 495 U.S. 641
Davis v. US 495 U.S. 472
Dept of Treasury, IRS v. FLRA 494 U.S. 922
NLRB v. Curtis Matheson Scientific 494 U.S. 775
Adams Fruit v. Barrett 494 U.S. 638
Dole v. United Steelworkers 494 U.S. 26
Sullivan v. Everhart 494 U.S. 83
Sullivan v. Zebley 493 U.S. 521
1988 TERM
PERS of Ohio v. Betts 492 U.S. 158
Mead Corp. v. Tilly 490 U.S. 714
Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council 490 U.S. 360
1987 TERM
Bowen v. Georgetown Hospital 488 U.S. 204
Mississippi Power & Light v. 
Mississippi 487 U.S. 354
Webster v. Doe 486 U.S. 592
Huffman v. Western Nuclear 486 U.S. 663
K Mart v. Cartier 486 U.S. 281
FERC v. Martin Exploration 486 U.S. 204
New York v. FCC 486 U.S. 57
EEOC v. Commercial Office 
Products 486 U.S. 107
DeBartolo v. FL Gulf Coast Building 485 U.S. 568
Traynor v. Turnage 485 U.S. 535
Gardebring v. Jenkins 485 U.S. 415
FLRA v. Aberdeen Proving Ground 485 U.S. 409
Bethesda Hosp. v. Bowen 485 U.S. 399
1986 TERM
NLRB v. United Food & Comm. 
Wrkrs. 484 U.S. 112
Mullins Coal v. OWCP 484 U.S. 135
Fall River Dyeing v. NLRB 482 U.S. 27
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 480 U.S. 421
Lukhard v. Reed 481 U.S. 368
Pleasant Grove v. U.S. 479 U.S. 462
Bowen v. Yuckert 482 U.S. 137
1985 TERM
CFTC v. Schor 478 U.S. 833
US DOT v. Paralyzed Veterans 477 U.S. 597
Atkins v. Rivera 477 U.S. 154
Young v. Community Nutrition Inst. 476 U.S. 974
Lyng v. Payne 476 U.S. 926
Bowen v. Amer. Hosp. Ass'n 476 U.S. 610
LA Public Service Com'n v. FCC 476 U.S. 355
US v. City of Fulton 475 U.S. 657
Bd of Gov of Fed v. Dimension 474 U.S. 361
1984 TERM
US v. Riverside Bayview Homes 474 U.S. 121
Pattern Makers League v. NLRB 473 U.S. 95
US v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce 472 U.S. 713
Mountain States T&T v. Pueblo 472 U.S. 237
CT Dept of Income Maintenance v. 
Heckler 471 U.S. 524
NLRB v. Int'l Longshoremans Assn 473 U.S. 61
Heckler v. Chaney 470 U.S. 821
Chemical Mnfrs Assn v. NRDC 470 U.S. 116
Lawrence Cnty v. Lead-Deadwood 469 U.S. 256
1983 TERM
ICC v. American Trucking Assn 467 U.S. 354
Securities Ind Assn v. Fed Reserve 468 U.S. 137
Sure-Tan v. NLRB 467 U.S. 883
Chevron v. NRDC 467 U.S. 837
Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp 467 U.S. 691
Aluminum Co v. Central Lincoln 467 U.S. 380
EEOC v. Shell Oil 466 U.S. 54
1982 TERM
BATF v. FLRA 464 U.S. 89
Pub Serv Cmmn of NY v. Mid-LA 
Gas 463 U.S. 319
Motor Veh. Mfrs Assn v. State Farm 463 U.S. 29
Nat Asn Greeting Card Pubs v. USPS 462 U.S. 810
Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. NRDC 462 U.S. 87
Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB 461 U.S. 731
Bob Jones Univ. v. US 461 U.S. 574
Heckler v. Campbell 461 U.S. 458
Am. Paper Inst. v. Am. Elec Pwr Svc 461 U.S. 402
Comm Tel of So Cal v. Gottfried 459 U.S. 498
1981 TERM
Fidelity Fed Sav & Loan v. de la 
Cuesta 458 U.S. 141
Schweiker v. Hogan 457 U.S. 569
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Blum v. Bacon 457 U.S. 132
N Haven Bd of Ed v. Bell 456 U.S. 512
Herweg v. Ray 455 U.S. 265
US v. Vogel Fertilizer 455 U.S. 16
US v. Clark 454 U.S. 555
Bonanno Linen Service v. NLRB 454 U.S. 404
1980 TERM
NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty Rural Elec 454 U.S. 170
FEC v. Dem. Senate Camp. Comm 454 U.S. 27
CBS v. FCC 453 U.S. 367
Haig v. Agee 453 U.S. 280
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers 453 U.S. 34
Am Textile Mfrs Inst v. Donovan 452 U.S. 490
Howe v. Smith 452 U.S. 273
Anderson Bros Ford v. Valencia 452 U.S. 205
St. Martin's Evangelical Lutheran v. 
SD 451 U.S. 772
Rowan Companies v. US 452 U.S. 247
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild 450 U.S. 582
Com of IRS v. Portland Cement Co. 450 U.S. 156
Steadman v. SEC 450 U.S. 91
Brd of Gov of Fed v. Invest. Co. Inst. 450 U.S. 46
Conrail v. Natl Assn Recycling Inds. 449 U.S. 609
EEOC v. Assoc. Dry Goods 449 U.S. 590
1979 TERM
Potomac Electric Power v. OWCP 449 U.S. 268
EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone 449 U.S. 64
Indus. Union Dep. v. Amer. Petr. 
Inst. 448 U.S. 607
Mohasco Corp v. Silver 447 U.S. 807
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall 445 U.S. 1
US v. Euge 444 U.S. 707
Ford Motor Credit Co v. Milhollin 444 U.S. 555
NLRB v. Yeshiva University 444 U.S. 672
Stryker's Bay Neighborhood v. 
Karlen 444 U.S. 223
1978 TERM
NLRB v. Baptist Hospital 442 U.S. 773
US v. Rutherford 442 U.S. 544
Andrus v. Sierra Club 442 U.S. 347
SE Comm College v. Davis 442 U.S. 397
Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB 441 U.S. 448
Gladstone v. Bellwood 441 U.S. 91
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp 440 U.S. 689
NLRB v. Catholic Bishops of 
Chicago 440 U.S. 490
Nat Muffler Dealers Assn v. US 440 U.S. 472
Miller v. Youakim 440 U.S. 125
Int Broth of Teamsters v. Daniel 439 U.S. 551
Thor Power Tools v. CIR 439 U.S. 522
1977 TERM
Federal Reserve v. 1st Lincolnwood 439 U.S. 234
FCC v. Pacifica 438 U.S. 726
California v. U.S. 438 U.S. 645
Eastex v. NLRB 437 U.S. 556
Beth Israel Hosp v. NLRB 437 U.S. 483
Zenith Radio v. US 437 U.S. 443
FCC v. Nat Citzns Com for 
Brdcasting 436 U.S. 775
In re Trans Alska Pipeline Rate Cases 436 U.S. 631
Quern v. Mandley 436 U.S. 725
California v. Southland Royalty 436 U.S. 519
SEC v. Sloan 436 U.S. 103
Vermont Yankee v. NRDC 435 U.S. 519
US v. Bd of Comrs of Sheffield, Ala 435 U.S. 110
NLRB v. Local Union No.103 434 U.S. 335
Adamo Wrecking Co v. US 434 U.S. 275
1976 TERM
Batterton v. Francis 432 U.S. 416
Beal v. Doe 432 U.S. 438
TWA v. Hardison 432 U.S. 63
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours v. Collins 432 U.S. 46
U.S. v. Larionoff 431 U.S. 864
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours v. Train 430 U.S. 112
Piper v. Chris-Craft 430 U.S. 1 
NLRB v. Enterprise Assn 429 U.S. 507
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APPENDIX B Coding of Ambiguous Cases




536 U.S. 101 Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.  Deference issue arose 
apparently arose only with respect to point on which the Court reversed, 
and only specific discussion of deference issue held Chevron
inapplicable.  Therefore, this case was coded as anti-deference.
Verizon v. 
FCC
535 U.S. 467 Court deferred on some issues but not on others.  The issues on which 
the Court granted deference were the most important issues, while the 
other issues were largely peripheral, so this case was coded as pro-
deference.
U.S. v. Mead 533 U.S. 218 Court reversed lower court’s ruling that tariff classification was not 
entitled to any deference, but held that Skidmore rather than Chevron 
deference applied.  Coded as anti-deference because the case is most 
often cited for the proposition that certain agency actions are not entitled 




531 U.S. 457 Court deferred on some issues but not on others.  The issues on which 
the Court granted deference appear to be the most important issues, 





525 U.S. 366 Court deferred on some issues but not others.  The issues seemed 
comparable in importance, and the pro- and anti-deference portions of 
the holding were cited with approximately the same frequency, so this 





508 U.S. 402 Court deferred to agency, but used language cited in subsequent cases 
indicating deference would be limited when the agency changes its 
position.  Because the case also contains pro-deference language and 
ultimately defers to the agency, the case was coded as pro-deference.
Lechmere v. 
NLRB
502 U.S. 527 Court holds that stare decisis principle trumps Chevron, but uses general 
language about how agency actions are normally entitled to deference.  
Because the Court does not defer, and the most important part of the 





499 U.S. 144 Court held that when Secretaries of Labor and Commerce issue 
conflicting interpretations of ambiguous OSHA regulation, courts 
should defer to Labor.  Because the case is most widely cited for its 
strong language explaining the policy rationale for judicial deference, 
the case was coded as pro-deference.
K Mart v. 
Cartier
486 U.S. 281 The Court (in a fractured opinion) deferred to some customs service 
regulations but held others conflicted with the language of the statute.  
Because the case was overwhelmingly cited, in subsequent cases, for its 
pro-deference language, the case was coded as pro-deference.
Lyng v. 
Payne
476 U.S. 926 The Court deferred to the agency, but used language, cited in a few 
subsequent cases, suggesting limits to agency discretion.  Because the 
outcome of the case and most of the opinion is predominantly 
supporting of agency decision-making on the relevant point, the case 
was coded as pro-deference.
NLRB v. Int’l 
Longshorema
ns Assn
473 U.S. 61 The Court refused to enforce an NLRB order that the Court held was 
inconsistent with the statute, but made some general statements, citied in 
subsequent cases, about the deference normally due NLRB 
interpretations of that statute.  Because of the outcome of the case and 
the language on limits to the deference due the NLRB, the decision was 
coded as anti-deference.
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Securities 
Ind. Assn. v 
Federal 
Reserve
468 U.S. 137 The Court used some general language about the deference normally 
due to Fed interpretations of the relevant statute, but the Court also 
stressed limits on that deference and invalidated the Fed’s action in this 






463 U.S. 319 The Court held that a FERC rule was inconsistent with the relevant 
statute, but the Court reversed part of the lower court opinion in order to 
give FERC discretion to make certain policy choices on remand.  
However, the overall tone of the case, and the propositions for which it 
is most cited, stress limitations on agency authority, the case was coded 
as anti-deference.
North Haven 
Bd. of Ed. v. 
Bell
456 U.S. 512 The Court upheld anti-discrimination regulations promulgated by HEW, 
and noted that agency interpretations are normally entitled to great 
deference, but asserted that the ordinary level of deference was not 






452 U.S. 490 The Court upheld one agency decision but invalidated another.  Because 
the pro- and anti-deference portions of the case appeared equally 




442 U.S. 773 The Court upheld one agency decision but invalidated another.  Because 
the pro- and anti-deference portions of the case appeared equally 
important, this case was coded as ambiguous.
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APPENDIX C: Cases Not Involving Review of a Federal Appellate Decision
Case Citation Case Origin
Yellow Transp. v. Michigan 123 S.Ct. 371 Michigan Supreme Court
Wisconsin Dept. of Health v. Blumer 534 U.S. 473 Wisconsin Court of Appeals
Smiley v. Citibank 517 U.S. 735 California Supreme Court
Miller v. Johnson 515 U.S. 900 Fed District, S.D. Georgia
PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dept. of Ecology 511 U.S. 700 Washington Supreme Court
U.S. v. Alaska 503 U.S. 569 Original jurisdiction
Presley v. Etowah County 502 U.S. 491 Fed District, M.D. Alabama
Mississippi Power & Light v. Mississippi 487 U.S. 354 Mississippi Supreme Court
Pleasant Grove v. U.S. 479 U.S. 462 Fed District, D.C.
Atkins v. Rivera 477 U.S. 154 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Federal Fidelity Sav. & Loan v. de la Cuesta 458 U.S. 141 California Court of Appeals
Schweiker v. Hogan 457 U.S. 569 Fed District, Massachusetts
St. Martins v. South Dakota 451 U.S. 772 South Dakota Supreme Court
U.S. v. Bd. Of Commissioners of Sheffield 435 U.S. 110 Fed District, Alabama
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Appendix D: Cases Ranked By Influence Score
Rank Case Cite Score
1 Chevron v. NRDC 467 U.S. 837 4.85
2 Motor Veh. Mfrs Assn 
v. State Farm 463 U.S. 29 4.67
3 Heckler v. Campbell 461 U.S. 458 4.6
4 Bowen v. Georgetown 
Hospital 488 U.S. 204 4.51
5 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 480 U.S. 421 4.34
6 Marsh v. Oregon Nat. 
Res. Council 490 U.S. 360 4.26
7 Heckler v. Chaney 470 U.S. 821 4.03
8 Bowen v. Yuckert 482 U.S. 137 3.99
9 K Mart v. Cartier 486 U.S. 281 3.89
10 U.S. v. Larionoff 431 U.S. 864 3.81
11 Thomas Jefferson U. v. 
Shalala 512 U.S. 504 3.8
12 Batterton v. Francis 432 U.S. 416 3.75
13 Ford Motor Credit Co v. 
Milhollin 444 U.S. 555 3.71
14 Mullins Coal v. OWCP 484 U.S. 135 3.7
15 Martin v. OHS Review 
Comm'n 499 U.S. 144 3.66
16 FEC v. Dem. Senate 
Camp. Comm 454 U.S. 27 3.65
17 NLRB v. Catholic 
Bishops of Chicago 440 U.S. 490 3.63
18 Nat Muffler Dealers 
Assn v. US 440 U.S. 472 3.57
19 NLRB v. United Food 
& Comm. Wrkrs. 484 U.S. 112 3.54
20 Maislin Industries v. 
Primary Steel 497 U.S. 116 3.49
21 Christensen v. Harris 
County 529 U.S. 576 3.48
22 Sure-Tan v. NLRB 467 U.S. 883 3.27
23 OWCP v. Greenwhich 
Collieries 512 U.S. 267 3.27
24 Sullivan v. Zebley 493 U.S. 521 3.25
25 Stryker's Bay 
Neighborhood v. Karlen 444 U.S. 223 3.16
26 INS v. Elias-Zacarias 502 U.S. 478 3.16
27 Zenith Radio v. US 437 U.S. 443 3.16
28 Zadvydas v. Davis 533 U.S. 678 3.15
29 Auer v. Robbins 519 U.S. 452 3.11
30 EEOC v. Arabian 
American Oil 499 U.S. 244 3.1
31 Young v. Community 
Nutrition Inst. 476 U.S. 974 3.06
32 Vermont Yankee v. 
NRDC 435 U.S. 519 3.02
33 Chemical Mnfrs Assn v. 
NRDC 470 U.S. 116 3.01
34 Potomac Electric Power 
v. OWCP 449 U.S. 268 2.99
35 US v. Mead 533 U.S. 218 2.94
36 Ford Motor Co. v. 
NLRB 441 U.S. 448 2.92
37 Baltimore Gas & Elec. 
v. NRDC 462 U.S. 87 2.88
38 Rust v. Sullivan 500 U.S. 173 2.84
39 US v. Nat'l Bank of 
Commerce 472 U.S. 713 2.84
40 Beal v. Doe 432 U.S. 438 2.83
41 Medtronic v. Lohr 518 U.S. 470 2.83
42 BATF v. FLRA 464 U.S. 89 2.82
43 Arkansas v. Oklahoma 503 U.S. 91 2.82
44 Bonanno Linen Service 
v. NLRB 454 U.S. 404 2.81
45 Reno v. Koray 515 U.S. 50 2.8
46 Com of IRS v. Portland 
Cement Co. 450 U.S. 156 2.79
47 Blum v. Bacon 457 U.S. 132 2.76
48 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre 526 U.S. 415 2.74
49 NLRB v. Yeshiva 
University 444 U.S. 672 2.73
50 Bd of Gov of Fed v. 
Dimension 474 U.S. 361 2.7
51 Pauley v. BethEnergy 
Mines 501 U.S. 680 2.69
52 Babbitt v. Sweet Home 
Chapter 515 U.S. 687 2.68
53 Shalala v. Guernsey 
Mem. Hosp. 514 U.S. 87 2.68
54 Fall River Dyeing v. 
NLRB 482 U.S. 27 2.66
55 NLRB v. Local Union 
No.103 434 U.S. 335 2.65
56 US v. Rutherford 442 U.S. 544 2.62
57 US v. Vogel Fertilizer 455 U.S. 16 2.62
58 US v. LaBonte 520 U.S. 751 2.59
59 Dole v. United 
Steelworkers 494 U.S. 26 2.58
60 Gardebring v. Jenkins 485 U.S. 415 2.55
61 EEOC v. Commercial 
Office Products 486 U.S. 107 2.5
62 PBGC v. LTV Corp. 496 U.S. 633 2.5
63 Allentown Mack Sales 
v. NLRB 522 U.S. 359 2.49
64 Am. Paper Inst. v. Am. 
Elec Pwr Svc 461 U.S. 402 2.46
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65 SEC v. Sloan 436 U.S. 103 2.45
66 Natl RR Passenger v. 
Boston & Maine 503 U.S. 407 2.45
67 Schweiker v. Gray 
Panthers 453 U.S. 34 2.44
68 NationsBank v. Variable 
Annuity 513 U.S. 251 2.41
69 Int Broth of Teamsters 
v. Daniel 439 U.S. 551 2.38
70 Webster v. Doe 486 U.S. 592 2.34
71 Sullivan v. Everhart 494 U.S. 83 2.33
72 US v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes 474 U.S. 121 2.32
73 Adams Fruit v. Barrett 494 U.S. 638 2.31
74 Dunn v. CFTC 519 U.S. 465 2.3
75 Sol. Waste Agy v. Army 
Corps of Eng. 531 U.S. 159 2.27
76 Rowan Companies v. 
US 452 U.S. 247 2.27
77 Andrus v. Sierra Club 442 U.S. 347 2.26
78 SE Comm College v. 
Davis 442 U.S. 397 2.26
79 Anderson Bros Ford v. 
Valencia 452 U.S. 205 2.26
80 Schweiker v. Hogan 457 U.S. 569 2.21
81 Aluminum Co v. 
Central Lincoln 467 U.S. 380 2.21
82 Miller v. Youakim 440 U.S. 125 2.18
83 Am Textile Mfrs Inst v. 
Donovan 452 U.S. 490 2.17
84 PERS of Ohio v. Betts 492 U.S. 158 2.17
85 Geier v. American 
Honda 529 U.S. 861 2.16
86 NLRB v. Town & 
Country Electric 516 U.S. 85 2.14
87 Atkins v. Rivera 477 U.S. 154 2.14
88 Smiley v. Citibank 517 U.S. 735 2.11
89 ICC v. American 
Trucking Assn 467 U.S. 354 2.08
90 NLRB v. Health Care & 
Retirement Co 511 U.S. 571 2.07
91 Beth Israel Hosp v. 
NLRB 437 U.S. 483 2.06
92 CFTC v. Schor 478 U.S. 833 2.06
93 Lincoln v. Vigil 508 U.S. 182 2.05
94 Litton Financial Printing 
v. NLRB 501 U.S. 190 2.03
95 Securities Ind Assn v. 
Fed Reserve 468 U.S. 137 2.02
96 Steadman v. SEC 450 U.S. 91 2.02
97 TWA v. Hardison 432 U.S. 63 2
98 E.I. Du Pont de 
Nemours v. Collins
432 U.S. 46 1.98
99 Indus. Union Dep. v. 
Amer. Petr. Inst. 448 U.S. 607 1.98
100 N Haven Bd of Ed v. 
Bell 456 U.S. 512 1.97
101 NLRB v. Curtis 
Matheson Scientific 494 U.S. 775 1.97
102 CT Dept of Income 
Maintenance v. Heckler 471 U.S. 524 1.94
103 AT&T v. Iowa Utilities 
Board 525 U.S. 366 1.94
104 US v. Clark 454 U.S. 555 1.94
105 US v. Euge 444 U.S. 707 1.93
106 US DOT v. Paralyzed 
Veterans 477 U.S. 597 1.93
107 Piper v. Chris-Craft 430 U.S. 1 1.92
108 Good Samaritan Hosp. 
v. Shalala 508 U.S. 402 1.88
109 Brown v. Gardner 513 U.S. 115 1.88
110 California v. Southland 
Royalty 436 U.S. 519 1.88
111 Dickinson v. Zurko 527 U.S. 150 1.87
112 EPA v. Nat'l Crushed 
Stone 449 U.S. 64 1.87
113 Capital Cities Cable v. 
Crisp 467 U.S. 691 1.87
114 Neal v. US 516 U.S. 284 1.85
115 Chicago v. 
Environmental Def 
Fund 511 U.S. 328 1.84
116 Estate of Cowart v. 
Niklos Drilling 505 U.S. 469 1.81
117 Quern v. Mandley 436 U.S. 725 1.81
118 FCC v. WNCN 
Listeners Guild 450 U.S. 582 1.8
119 Pub Serv Cmmn of NY 
v. Mid-LA Gas 463 U.S. 319 1.78
120 Regions Hospital v. 
Shalala 522 U.S. 448 1.78
121 ABF Freight v. NLRB 510 U.S. 317 1.78
122 Atlantic Mut Ins Co v. 
C.I.R. 523 U.S. 382 1.75
123 LA Public Service 
Com'n v. FCC 476 U.S. 355 1.75
124 Edelman v. Lynchberg 
College 535 U.S. 106 1.74
125 US v. Bd of Comrs of 
Sheffield, Ala 435 U.S. 110 1.73
126 New York v. FCC 486 U.S. 57 1.71
127 Bethesda Hosp. v. 
Bowen 485 U.S. 399 1.71
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128 Demarest v. 
Manspeaker 498 U.S. 184 1.71
129 Herweg v. Ray 455 U.S. 265 1.67
130 Whirlpool Corp. v. 
Marshall 445 U.S. 1 1.66
131 St. Martin's Evangelical 
Lutheran v. SD 451 U.S. 772 1.63
132 Federal Reserve v. 1st 
Lincolnwood 439 U.S. 234 1.62
133 Traynor v. Turnage 485 U.S. 535 1.62
134 EEOC v. Assoc. Dry 
Goods 449 U.S. 590 1.6
135 Holly Farms v. NLRB 517 U.S. 392 1.59
136 Fort Stewart Schools v. 
FLRA 495 U.S. 641 1.57
137 Dept of Treasury, IRS v. 
FLRA 494 U.S. 922 1.57
138 FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco 529 U.S. 120 1.56
139 FERC v. Martin 
Exploration 486 U.S. 204 1.55
140 Your Home Nursing v. 
Shalala 525 U.S. 449 1.51
141 Barnhart v. Walton 535 U.S. 212 1.49
142 Lechmere v. NLRB 502 U.S. 527 1.48
143 Fidelity Fed Sav & 
Loan v. de la Cuesta 458 U.S. 141 1.48
144 NLRB v. Hendricks 
Cnty Rural Elec 454 U.S. 170 1.47
145 Conrail v. Natl Assn 
Recycling Inds. 449 U.S. 609 1.47
146 NLRB v. Baptist 
Hospital 442 U.S. 773 1.46
147 Bob Jones Univ. v. US 461 U.S. 574 1.45
148 Bragdon v. Abbott 524 U.S. 624 1.44
149 Cottage Savings v. CIR 499 U.S. 554 1.43
150 INS v. St. Cyr 533 U.S. 289 1.41
151 FLRA v. Aberdeen 
Proving Ground 485 U.S. 409 1.41
152 Presley v. Etowah 
County 502 U.S. 491 1.4
153 Chevron v. Echazabal 536 U.S. 73 1.35
154 Bowen v. Amer. Hosp. 
Ass'n 476 U.S. 610 1.35
155 MCI v. AT&T 512 U.S. 218 1.35
156 Ragsdale v. Wolverine 
WW 535 U.S. 81 1.34
157 DeBartolo v. FL Gulf 
Coast Building 485 U.S. 568 1.32
158 US v. Thompson/Center 
Arms Co. 504 U.S. 505 1.32
159 Gladstone v. Bellwood 441 U.S. 91 1.31
160 US v. City of Fulton 475 U.S. 657 1.31
161 Pattern Makers League 
v. NLRB 473 U.S. 95 1.3
162 E.I. Du Pont de 
Nemours v. Train 430 U.S. 112 1.3
163 CBS v. FCC 453 U.S. 367 1.28
164 Lyng v. Payne 476 U.S. 926 1.27
165 Davis v. US 495 U.S. 472 1.25
166 Mead Corp. v. Tilly 490 U.S. 714 1.24
167 FCC v. Midwest Video 
Corp 440 U.S. 689 1.23
168 Verizon v. FCC 535 U.S. 467 1.22
169 NLRB v. Enterprise 
Assn 429 U.S. 507 1.17
170 FCC v. Nat Citzns Com 
for Brdcasting 436 U.S. 775 1.13
171 US v. Cleveland Indians 532 U.S. 200 1.1
172 US v. Haggar Apparel 526 U.S. 380 1.06
173 Haig v. Agee 453 U.S. 280 1.04
174 Wis. Dep of Health v. 
Blumer 534 U.S. 473 1.04
175 FCC v. Pacifica 438 U.S. 726 1.03
176 Adamo Wrecking Co v. 
US 434 U.S. 275 1.03
177 NLRB v. KY River 
Comm. Care 532 U.S. 706 1.02
178 Bill Johnson's 
Restaurants v. NLRB 461 U.S. 731 0.99
179 Howe v. Smith 452 U.S. 273 0.99
180 Brd of Gov of Fed v. 
Invest. Co. Inst. 450 U.S. 46 0.98
181 Thor Power Tools v. 
CIR 439 U.S. 522 0.98
182 Mountain States T&T v. 
Pueblo 472 U.S. 237 0.95
183 In re Trans Alska 
Pipeline Rate Cases 436 U.S. 631 0.91
184 PUD No. 1  v. Wash 
Dep of Ecol 511 U.S. 700 0.88
185 Lawrence Cnty v. Lead-
Deadwood 469 U.S. 256 0.88
186 US v. Alaska 503 U.S. 569 0.86
187 Pleasant Grove v. U.S. 479 U.S. 462 0.82
188 New York v. FERC 535 U.S. 1 0.81
189 Natl Fed of Fed Empl v. 
Dep of Inter. 526 U.S. 86 0.81
190 Eastex v. NLRB 437 U.S. 556 0.79
191 INS v. Natl Center for 
Immigrants Rts 502 U.S. 183 0.78
192 Mobil Oil v. United 
Distribution 498 U.S. 211 0.78
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193 Norfolk Southern v. 
Shanklin
529 U.S. 344 0.75
194 SEC v. Zandford 535 U.S. 813 0.73
195 Yellow Transp v. 
Michigan 123 S.Ct. 371 0.69
196 INS v. Ventura 123 S.Ct. 353 0.69
197 Nat'l Credit Union v. 1st 
Nat'l Bank 522 U.S. 479 0.69
198 Lopez v. Davis 531 U.S. 230 0.68
199 Lukhard v. Reed 481 U.S. 368 0.67
200 Nat Asn Greeting Card 
Pubs v. USPS 462 U.S. 810 0.57
201 California v. U.S. 438 U.S. 645 0.56
202 Whitman v. American 
Trucking 531 U.S. 457 0.55
203 US v. Fior D'Italia 536 U.S. 238 0.54
204 Reno v. Flores 507 U.S. 292 0.53
205 Metro Broadcasting v. 
FCC 497 U.S. 547 0.51
206 Shalala v. Ill Council on 
Longterm Care 529 U.S. 1 0.51
207 Huffman v. Western 
Nuclear 486 U.S. 663 0.5
208 Comm Tel of So Cal v. 
Gottfried 459 U.S. 498 0.48
209 Nat'l Cable & Telecom 
v. Gulf Power 534 U.S. 327 0.46
210 US v. O'Hagan 521 U.S. 642 0.46
211 Miller v. Johnson 515 U.S. 900 0.31
212 National RR Corp v. 
Morgan 536 U.S. 101 0.31
213 American Hosp Assn v. 
NLRB 499 U.S. 606 0.29
214 NLRB v. Int'l 
Longshoremans Assn 473 U.S. 61 0.27
215 EEOC v. Shell Oil 466 U.S. 54 0.27
216 Barnhart v. Sigmon 
Coal 534 U.S. 438 0.26
217 Sutton v. United Air 527 U.S. 471 0.19
218 NASA v. FLRA 527 U.S. 229 0.19
219 Gregory v. Ashcroft 501 U.S. 452 0.16
220 Mississippi Power & 
Light v. Mississippi 487 U.S. 354 0.15
221 Mohasco Corp v. Silver 447 U.S. 807 0.14
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APPENDIX E: Cases where Rehnquist and Stevens Divided on the Deference Issue
(boldface indicates which way the case came out)
CASE Citation Rehnquist Vote Stevens Vote
2001 Term
National RR Corp v. Morgan 536 U.S. 101 Pro-deference Anti-deference
Wis. Dep’t of Health v. Blumer 534 U.S. 473 Pro-deference Anti-deference
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal 534 U.S. 327 Anti-deference Pro-deference
2000 Term
Zadvydas v. Davis 533 U.S. 678 Pro-deference Anti-deference
INS v. St. Cyr 533 U.S. 289 Pro-deference Anti-deference
NLRB v. Ky. River Comm. Care 532 U.S. 706 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Solid Waste Agy. V. Army Corps of Engineers 531 U.S. 159 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1999 Term
Geier v. Amer. Honda 529 U.S. 861 Pro-deference Anti-deference
Christensen v. Harris County 529 U.S. 576 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Norfolk Southern v. Shanklin 529 U.S. 344 Anti-deference Pro-deference
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tocacco 529 U.S. 120 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Shalala v. Ill. Council on Longterm Care 529 U.S. 1 Pro-deference Anti-deference
1998 Term
Sutton v. United Air 527 U.S. 471 Anti-deference Pro-deference
NASA v. FLRA 527 U.S. 229 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Dickinson v. Zurko 527 U.S. 150 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Nat’l Fed. of Fed. Empl. v. Dep. of Interior 526 U.S. 86 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1997 Term
Bragdon v. Abbott 524 U.S. 624 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Nat’l Credit Union v. 1st Nat’l Bank 522 U.S. 479 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Allentown Mack Sales v. NLRB 522 U.S. 359 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1996 Term
US v. O’Hagan 521 U.S. 642 Anti-deference Pro-deference
US v. LaBonte 520 U.S. 751 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1995 Term
Medtronic v. Lohr 518 U.S. 470 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Holly Farms v. NLRB 517 U.S. 392 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1994 Term
Miller v. Johnson 515 U.S. 900 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter 515 U.S. 687 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Reno v. Koray 515 U.S. 50 Pro-deference Anti-deference
1993 Term
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala 512 U.S. 504 Pro-deference Anti-deference
OWCP v. Greenwhich Collieries 512 U.S. 267 Anti-deference Pro-deference
MCI v. AT&T 512 U.S. 218 Anti-deference Pro-deference
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Co. 511 U.S. 571 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Chicago v. Env. Def. Fund 511 U.S. 328 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1992 Term
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala 508 U.S. 402 Pro-deference Anti-deference
Reno v. Flores 507 U.S. 292 Pro-deference Anti-deference
1991 Term
US v. Thompson/Center Arms Co. 504 U.S. 505 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Presley v. Etoway County 502 U.S. 491 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Lechmere v. NLRB 502 U.S. 478 Anti-deference Pro-deference
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INS v. Elias Zacarias 502 U.S. 478 Pro-deference Anti-deference
1990 Term
Litton Financial Planning v. NLRB 501 U.S. 190 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Rust v. Sullivan 500 U.S. 173 Pro-deference Anti-deference
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil 499 U.S. 244 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1989 Term
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC 497 U.S. 547 Anti-deference Pro-deference
PBGC v. LTV Corp. 496 U.S. 633 Pro-deference Anti-deference
IRS v. FLRA 494 U.S. 922 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Dole v. United Steelworkers 494 U.S. 26 Pro-deference Anti-deference
Sullivan v. Everhart 494 U.S. 83 Pro-deference Anti-deference
Sullivan v. Zebley 493 U.S. 521 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1988 Term
Mead Corp. v. Tilly 490 U.S. 714 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1987 Term
K Mart v. Cartier 486 U.S. 281 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1986 Term
Fall River Dyeing v. NLRB 482 U.S. 27 Anti-deference Pro-deference
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 480 U.S. 421 Pro-deference Anti-deference
Pleasant Grove v. US 479 U.S. 462 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1985 Term
Young v. Community Nutrition Inst. 476 U.S. 974 Pro-deference Anti-deference
Lyng v. Pane 476 U.S. 926 Pro-deference Anti-deference
1984 Term
Pattern Makers League v. NLRB 473 U.S. 95 Pro-deference Anti-deference
US v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce 472 U.S. 713 Pro-deference Anti-deference
NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremans Ass’n 473 U.S. 61 Pro-deference Anti-deference
Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. NRDC 470 U.S. 116 Pro-deference Anti-deference
Lawrence City v. Lead-Deadwood 469 U.S. 256 Pro-deference Anti-deference
1983 Term
ICC v. American Trucking Ass’n 467 U.S. 354 Pro-deference Anti-deference
Securities Ind. Ass’n v. Fed. Reserve 468 U.S. 137 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Sure-Tan v. NLRB 467 U.S. 883 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Aluminum Co. v. Central Lincoln 467 U.S. 380 Pro-deference Anti-deference
EEOC v. Shell Oil 466 U.S. 54 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1982 Term
Motor Veh. Mnfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 463 U.S. 29 Pro-deference Anti-deference
Bob Jones Univ. v. US 461 U.S. 574 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1981 Term
Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan v. de la Cuesta 458 U.S. 141 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1980 Term
NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. 454 U.S. 170 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers 453 U.S. 34 Pro-deference Anti-deference
Howe v. Smith 452 U.S. 273 Pro-deference Anti-deference
1979 Term
US v. Euge 444 U.S. 707 Pro-deference Anti-deference
1978 Term
Gladstone v. Bellwood 441 U.S. 91 Anti-deference Pro-deference
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. 440 U.S. 689 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. US 440 U.S. 472 Pro-deference Anti-deference
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1977 Term
Eastex v. NLRB 437 U.S. 556 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB 437 U.S. 483 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. US 434 U.S. 275 Anti-deference Pro-deference
1976 Term
Batterton v. Francis 432 U.S. 416 Pro-deference Anti-deference
US v. Larionoff 431 U.S. 864 Anti-deference Pro-deference
Piper v. Chris-Craft 430 U.S. 1 Anti-deference Pro-deference
